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“If you think Stuxnet is revolutionary then you slept through the
revolution.”1
INTRODUCTION
In 2010, a tech-security firm in the Republic of Belarus first
detected the piece of computer malware now known as
“Stuxnet.”2 Computer experts first knew Stuxnet as a hack of the
Windows operating system, itself a substantial feat.3 Subsequent
analysis of Stuxnet’s code, however, revealed something of far
greater significance: Western governments, most probably Israel
and the United States, had likely designed the computer worm
to target an Iranian nuclear weapons facility.4 Specifically, the
worm appears to have been constructed to destroy uranium
enrichment centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility, in an
1. Christopher Williams, Stuxnet: Cyber Attack on Iran ‘Was Carried Out by Western
Powers and Israel,’ TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/8274009/Stuxnet-Cyber-attack-on-Iran-was-carried-out-by-Western-powersand-Israel.html (quoting cyber-security expert Tom Parker).
2. See Jonathan Fildes, Stuxnet Worm ‘Targeted High-Value Iranian Assets,’ BBC
NEWS, Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11388018 (stating that
Stuxnet was discovered in Belarus in June 2010); Michael J. Gross, A Declaration of CyberWar, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2011, at 152, 155 (describing how Sergey Ulasen, the head of
the Belarusian tech-security firm VirusBlokAda, first received a report of an Iranian
computer that was infected with Stuxnet). The name Stuxnet derives from the file
names “.stub” and “MrxNet.sys” contained in Stuxnet’s code. Kim Zetter, How Digital
Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History, WIRED, (July 11, 2011,
7:00
AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectivesdeciphered-stuxnet/all/1; A Worm in the Centrifuge: The Stuxnet Outbreak, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 2, 2010, at 63, 63–64 (stating that Stuxnet’s name is derived from words found in
its code). Malware is defined as “software that is intended to damage or disable
computers and computer systems.” OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1060 (3d ed. 2010).
3. See John Borland, A Four-Day Dive into Stuxnet’s Heart, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010,
8:27 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/a-four-day-dive-into-stuxnetsheart (describing Microsoft’s sophisticated response to Stuxnet’s impressive infiltration
of the Windows operating system); Liam O. Murchu, Stuxnet Using Three Additional ZeroOFFICIAL
BLOG
(Sept.
14,
2010),
Day
Vulnerabilities,
SYMANTEC:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-using-three-additional-zero-dayvulnerabilities (reporting that Symantec, a tech-security firm, had discovered that
Stuxnet exploited four vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system).
4. See generally William J. Broad et al., Israel Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear
Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1 (arguing that Israel aided the United States in
developing Stuxnet specifically to strike the Natanz nuclear facility); Gross, supra note
2, at 196 (describing how various computer scientists concluded that Western
governments created Stuxnet to hinder the Iranian nuclear program).
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attempt to impede Iran’s nuclear weapons program.5 Although
Iranian officials initially denied that nuclear sites suffered any
damage from Stuxnet, Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad later confirmed that Stuxnet had infected a
“limited number of [] centrifuges” at Iranian nuclear facilities.6
There is, however, strong evidence that significantly greater
damage was done to Iran’s nuclear program than President
Ahmadinejad suggested.7
Stuxnet seems to have had two predominant purposes.
First, it includes code that, when executed, dramatically raised
and lowered the centrifuges’ rotational speed, causing the
centrifuges to destroy themselves. 8 Second, the worm sent
signals to plant operators indicating that the centrifuges were
working normally, so that the operators were not alerted to the
problem and were unable to prevent the centrifuges from selfdestructing.9

5. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (opining on how Israel and the United States
tested Stuxnet on centrifuges identical to those used at the Natanz nuclear facility);
Zetter, supra note 2 (noting that Stuxnet’s code targeted devices configured in groups
of 164, and that centrifuges in Natanz were arranged in groups of 164).
6. Janine Zacharia, In Arab States’ Fears, Israel Sees Impetus for Action Against Iran,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2010, at A15; see Iran Denies Stuxnet Disrupted Its Nuclear
Programme, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2010, 11:17 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-11821011 (noting that Iranian officials stated they had caught Stuxnet
before it did any damage to the Iranian nuclear program).
7. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (noting that the Iranians took 984 centrifuges at
Natanz out of service after Stuxnet infiltrated Natanz’s network); Zetter, supra note 2
(stating that International Atomic Energy Agency surveillance footage showed over
1000 centrifuges being replaced at Natanz after Stuxnet).
8. See DAVID ALBRIGHT ET AL., INST. FOR SCI. & INT’L SEC., DID STUXNET TAKE OUT
1,000 CENTRIFUGES AT THE NATANZ ENRICHMENT PLANT? 4 (2010), available at
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/stuxnet_FEP_22Dec2010.pdf
(noting that Stuxnet destroyed centrifuges by raising the centrifuge rotation frequency
as high as 1410 hertz); Broad et al., supra note 4 (explaining that Stuxnet sent
centrifuges at Natanz “spinning wildly out of control”).
9. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (stating that Stuxnet recorded normal operations
at Natanz and then played the recording back to plant operators, as robbers might
during a bank heist); Ralph Langer, How to Hijack a Controller: Why Stuxnet Isn’t Just
About Siemens’ PLCs, CONTROL GLOBAL (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.controlglobal.com/
articles/2011/IndustrialControllers1101.html?page=full (describing the signals sent to
controllers and comparing them to a Hollywood movie where prerecorded video is sent
to security guards).
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The origins of the worm are unknown.10 The United States
has refused to confirm or deny any involvement in Stuxnet’s
development or deployment. 11 There is, however, strong
evidence supporting the theory that Israel and the United States
created Stuxnet specifically to target and damage Iran’s nuclear
program, which, if true, represents one of the first excursions of
governments into the murky waters of cyber war.12
The occurrence of an event like Stuxnet is no surprise in
light of the explosion of internet and computer technology in
recent decades.13 Today, computers connected to the Internet
are responsible for controlling most national infrastructure and,
therefore, are essential to states’ everyday commercial
functioning.14 As states increasingly depend upon information
structures to enable commercial and government functions,

10. See Gross, supra note 2, at 196 (speculating that Jordan may have been
involved in Stuxnet’s development); Bruce Schneier, The Story Behind the Virus,
FORBES.COM (Oct. 7, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/06/irannuclear-computer-technology-security-stuxnet-worm.html (noting that the theory that
Western governments developed Stuxnet is speculative).
11. See Christopher Williams, Stuxnet Virus: US Refuses to Deny Involvement,
TELEGRAPH (London) (May 27, 2011, 3:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/news/8541587/Stuxnet-virus-US-refuses-to-deny-involvement.html
(reporting that US Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn refused to answer a
question from a reporter for CNBC’s “CodeWars” television program asking if the
Department of Defense was involved in the development of Stuxnet); Kim Zetter, Senior
Defense Official Caught Hedging on US Involvement in Stuxnet, WIRED (May 26, 2011, 2:33
PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/defense-department-stuxnet
(characterizing US Deputy Defense Secretary Lynn’s response as “hedging”).
12. See Cyberwar: The Meaning of Stuxnet, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2010, at 14 (stating
that after years of speculation, Stuxnet is one of the first real-life incidents to
demonstrate cyber war’s potential); infra Part II (describing the legal construct for
cyber war).
13. See Lesley Swanson, The Era of Cyber Warfare: Applying International
Humanitarian Law to the 2008 Russian-Georgian Cyber Conflict, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 303, 305 (2010) (stating that whether governments are prepared or not, cyber
weapons are becoming commonplace). Targeting government infrastructure with
malware is not a novel idea; the film Live Free or Die Hard, produced years before
Stuxnet’s deployment, featured hackers attempting to destroy government
infrastructure. See LIVE FREE OR DIE HARD (20th Century Fox 2007).
14. See Scott J. Shackelford, From Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks
in International Law, 27 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 192, 200 (2009) (remarking that
information technology is “ubiquitous” and essential to “the US’s entire
infrastructure”); Swanson, supra note 13, at 306 (describing the Internet as “a powerful
tool for government functions, information, and mobilization, as well as commerce and
social networking”).
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these structures “tend to become [militarily desirable] targets.”15
The low cost, anonymity, and the ability to target installations
without necessarily causing civilian casualties make cyberoperations an appealing method of warfare.16 As the Internet
becomes a primary vehicle for societal function, it could also be
used as a means to harm society.17
This reality has not gone unnoticed by most governments.
Over 120 countries have developed information operations
systems.18 Security experts have gone as far as designating cyber
threats as the greatest danger to US national security outside of
weapons of mass destruction.19 Indeed, the Russian government
considers cyber threats so serious that they have retained the
right to use nuclear weapons in response to a cyber attack.20
15. Swanson, supra note 13, at 305.
16. See id. at 304 (noting that cyber weapons are attractive to governments because
of their low cost and wide availability); Shackelford, supra note 14, at 200 (discussing
the problem with attributing cyber attacks to specific parties); see also Michael N.
Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a
Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 897 (1999) (stating that cyber
weapons are how parties can conduct “war on the cheap”).
17. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 306 (noting that the Internet can “serve as a
tool for conducting operations that lead to confusion, destruction, and even death”);
see also Glenn Derene, How Vulnerable Is U.S. Infrastructure to a Major Cyber Attack?,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct. 1, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/
technology/military/4307521 (highlighting the “growing concern” over a cyber attack
on civilian infrastructure).
18. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-84, INFORMATION
SECURITY: COMPUTER ATTACKS AT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSE INCREASING RISKS 27
(1996) (“[The US] Department of Energy and [the US National Security Agency]
estimate that more than 120 countries have established computer attack capabilities.”);
see also Government-Sponsored Cyberattacks on the Rise, McAfee Says, NETWORK WORLD,
(Nov. 29, 2007, 3:41 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/112907government-cyberattacks.html (“120 countries including the United States are said to
be launching Web espionage operations.”).
19. See Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use Under
International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 123 (2009) (noting that cyber weapons are the
biggest threat to the United States “other than a weapon of mass destruction or a bomb
on one of our major cities”); Fred Hetner, Cyber Attacks Ranked 3rd Danger Behind
Nuclear War, EXAMINER.COM, Dec. 6, 2009, http://www.examiner.com/ny-in-new-york/
cyber-attacks-ranked-3rd-danger-behind-nuclear-war (“Some experts have said that
cyber attacks pose the greatest threat to the United States after nuclear war and
weapons of mass destruction . . . .”).
20. See Vida M. Antolin-Jenkins, Defining the Parameters of Cyberwar Operations:
Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places?, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 166 n.124 (2005)
(quoting V.I. Tsymbal, a Russian military officer, as stating: “Russia retains the right to
use nuclear weapons first against the means and forces of information warfare, and
then against the aggressor state itself”); Danny Bradbury, The Fog of Cyberwar,
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The seriousness with which governments consider cyber
attacks highlights the emerging reality of computer network
attacks (“CNA”) as a weapon of war and underscores the need
for a legal framework that can adequately regulate the use of
these new weapons. A consensus appears to exist that current
law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) regulations are applicable to
the use of cyber weapons, despite the absence of any LOAC
provision explicitly stating so. 21 There is an ongoing debate,
however, as to whether current LOAC paradigms can adequately
regulate these types of attacks.22
In an effort to address this question, this Note analyzes the
facts surrounding one of the few publicly known cyber attacks,
Stuxnet, but assumes a hypothetical situation in which the
LOAC applies. This Note thus addresses whether the
deployment of Stuxnet conforms to the LOAC. Part I presents
the facts of Stuxnet’s development and deployment. Part II
briefly discusses the history of the LOAC and then describes
LOAC principles relevant to Stuxnet. Part III then applies the
current LOAC to Stuxnet, identifying possible violations. This
Note concludes that, with the possible exception of certain
“knock-on” effects, current LOAC rules adequately address

GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/feb/05/
kyrgyzstan-cyberattack-internet-access (reporting V.I. Tsymbal as stating that Russia may
use nuclear weapons against sources of cyber war).
21. Knut Dörmann, Computer Network Attack and International Humanitarian Law,
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ¶ 29 (May 19, 2001), http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5p2alj (stating that the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) applies to
cyber weapons just as it would to any other new technology); see Michael N. Schmitt,
Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 365,
369 (2002) (stating that cyber weapons are covered under the LOAC and that there is
“no lawless void” during an armed conflict).
22. Compare Eric Talbot Jensen, Unexpected Consequences from Knock-On Effects: A
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1145, 1148–
49 (2003) (arguing that the application of traditional analysis, including distinction,
proportionality, and the balance between military necessity and humanity, sufficiently
regulates computer network attacks (“CNAs”), and that new agreements are not
needed), with Bradley Raboin, Corresponding Evolution: International Law and the
Emergence of Cyber Warfare, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 602, 667 (2011)
(“[D]elay in the formation of international treaties, limiting the use of and defining
the status of cyber warfare under international law, risks devastating global
repercussions.”).
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Stuxnet and that Stuxnet therefore demonstrates the LOAC’s
capability of regulating cyber war.23
I.

STUXNET

In order to understand the application of the LOAC to
Stuxnet, this Part offers an overview of the Stuxnet worm and
the consequences of its deployment at the Natanz enrichment
facility in Iran. First, Section A provides a general explanation of
computer worms and a comparison to other types of malware.
Next, Section B describes how Stuxnet worked. Section C then
turns to the theories behind the development of Stuxnet and
Section D recounts the damage that Stuxnet caused at the
Natanz facility. Section E describes Stuxnet’s proliferation and
its effects worldwide. Finally, Section F draws conclusions about
the Stuxnet worm and sets forth a set of hypothetical facts that
the rest of this Note assumes.
A. Computer Worms Generally
Simply put, a computer worm is a piece of computer code
that replicates without a human user’s commands by copying
itself onto another computer in a network.24 Malware such as
worms can therefore contain nothing other than an instruction
to self-replicate.25 While this may seem harmless, a worm that has
located a vulnerability in a network or computer’s security
system can “clog” both the computer itself and the servers on
the network with useless self-replications, thereby causing
23. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1149 (implying that knock-on effects are
consequences from an attack that a commander did not intend or plan to occur);
Schmitt, supra note 21, at 392 (describing knock-on effects as “second-tier” effects not
“directly and immediately caused by the attack, but nevertheless the product thereof”).
24. See PETER SZOR, THE ART OF COMPUTER VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE 314
(2005) (“[W]orms usually do not need to infect files but propagate as standalone
programs.”); What Is a Computer Worm?, ANTIVIRUS WORLD, http://antivirusworld.com/
articles/computer-worm.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2012) (“A computer worm is a selfreplicating computer program . . . [that is] self-contained and does not need to be part
of another program to propagate itself.”). This differs from a computer “virus,” which
is a piece of code that “attaches itself” to an existing program on the computer and
modifies that program in a harmful way. See What Is a Computer Worm?, supra (noting a
virus attaches to, and becomes a part of, an executable file).
25. See SZOR, supra note 24, at 296 (“[T]he majority of computer viruses do
nothing but replicate.”); What Is a Computer Worm?, supra note 24 (noting that a selfreplicating worm can do significant damage).
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significant damage.26 Program designers therefore attempt to
prevent the introduction of worms into their systems by
upgrading their programs, while malware designers search for
new weaknesses in the program’s defense.27
B.

Stuxnet’s Code and Its Effects

Like most worms, Stuxnet’s code causes it to spread to a
new computer on the network whenever it detects one,
regardless of the type of programs the new computer is
running.28 Stuxnet, however, differs from many worms in that, in
addition to containing code for self-replication, it also contains a
“payload” designed to give specific commands to other
programs.29 A payload is code that typically accomplishes the
“purpose” of the malware.30 After Stuxnet infects a computer, it
attempts to find out whether Siemens’ WinCC/PCS7
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition software (“Siemens’
SCADA software”) is present on the computer. 31 Siemens’
26. See SZOR, supra note 24, at 297 (explaining the danger of excessive selfreplication); What Is a Computer Worm?, supra note 24 (describing the Mydoom worm,
which caused a worldwide internet slowdown through its unchecked self-replication).
27. See, e.g., Microsoft Issues Biggest Patch on Record, REUTERS, Oct. 13, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/13/us-microsoft-securityidUSTRE59C5EJ20091013 (stating that Microsoft updated its operating system to fix
vulnerabilities); Matthew J. Schwartz, Microsoft, Adobe Patch Vulnerabilities,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept. 14, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/
news/security/app-security/231601407 (noting that Adobe updated its software to fix
“critical security issues”).
28. See ALEKSANDRA MATROSOV ET AL., ESET, STUXNET UNDER THE MICROSCOPE
10, available at http://www.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/Stuxnet_Under_the_
Microscope.pdf (“Once self-replicating code is released, it’s difficult to exercise
complete control over where it goes, what it does, and how far it spreads . . . .”); Gross,
supra note 2, at 158 (explaining how Stuxnet moves through a computer network).
29. See NICOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., SYMANTEC SEC. RESPONSE, W32.STUXNET
DOSSIER 2 (2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/
media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf (“[Stuxnet] modifies
code on the Siemens PLCs to potentially sabotage the system.”); MATROSOV ET. AL,
supra note 28, at 10 (noting that Stuxnet’s “payload” is targeted at Siemens’
WinCC/PCS7 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition software (“Siemens’ SCADA
software”)).
30. See Payload Definition, PC MAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_
term/0,2542,t=payload&i=48909,00.asp#fbid=56CJhRA5C9H (last visited Nov. 8, 2011)
(“In the analysis of worms . . . it refers to the software’s harmful results.”).
31. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 33 (“When [Siemens’ SCADA software]
is found inside a project folder, the project may be infected.”); see also Gross, supra note
2, at 158 (stating that Stuxnet specifically searches for Siemens’ software).
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SCADA software is a system that coordinates certain types of
industrial hardware, overseeing and controlling basic
components of an industrial system. 32 If Siemens’ SCADA
software is not present, Stuxnet “deactivates” and becomes an
inert piece of code.33
If Stuxnet detects Siemens’ SCADA software, it then looks
to see if the software is being used to control a programmable
logic controller (“PLC”). 34 PLCs are small computers that
typically control simple industrial tasks such as regulating
motors and opening and closing valves.35 Once Stuxnet detects
the PLC, it searches to see if a certain type of machinery is
attached to the PLC.36 If Stuxnet finds the correct machinery, it
checks to see if that component is operating under a specified
set of conditions—most notably a specific speed at which the

32. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (describing Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition systems as running “whole symphonies of industrial instruments, sensors
and machines”); Kim Zetter, SCADA System’s Hard-Coded Password Circulated Online for
Years, WIRED (July 19, 2010, 5:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/
siemens-scada/ (“SCADA, short for ‘supervisory control and data acquisition,’ systems
are programs installed in utilities and manufacturing facilities to manage their
operations.”).
33. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3 (describing how Stuxnet only deploys
its payload on a computer with Siemens’ SCADA software installed); Gross, supra note
2, at 158 (stating that Stuxnet “becomes a useless, inert feature on the network” if
Siemens’ SCADA software is not detected).
34. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 36 (noting that Stuxnet attempts to
monitor programmable logic controllers (“PLCs”)); Gross, supra note 2, at 158 (“When
Stuxnet moves into a computer, it attempts to spread to every machine on that
computer’s network and to find out whether any [PLCs] are running Siemens
software.”).
35. See Paul Marks, Why the Stuxnet Worm Is Like Nothing Seen Before, NEWSCIENTIST
(Jan. 18, 2011, 2:16 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19504-why-thestuxnet-worm-is-like-nothing-seen-before.html (describing PLCs as controlling the
process of industrial automation); Zetter, supra note 2 (noting that PLCs are involved
in the control of “everything from motors in packaging assembly lines to critical valves
in gas pipelines”).
36. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (stating that Stuxnet only “kicked into gear” in
the presence of specific machinery); Gross, supra note 2, at 158 (explaining that
Stuxnet “fingerprints” the PLC and looks for a specific type of machinery).
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machinery rotates.37 Finally, if the conditions are met, Stuxnet
delivers its payload.38
Stuxnet’s payload appears to be designed to achieve two
things. First, it sends instructions to the PLCs to initiate quick
changes in the centrifuge’s rotational frequencies.39 These quick
speed changes “sabotage[] the normal operation of the
industrial control process.” 40 Although other machines or
equipment may be unaffected by these changes in motor speed,
the shifts cause harm to uranium centrifuges. 41 Second, the
worm also installs a rootkit—software that enables undetectable
access to a computer—which is able to send signals to facility
operators that the PLCs are functioning normally. 42 System
operators are therefore unable to recognize the problem and
disconnect the motors from the PLC.43
To achieve all this, Stuxnet itself must also be able to
effectively hide from detection. When Stuxnet spreads, it uses a
“digital signature” to verify its authenticity with the newly
infected host computer. 44 Digital signatures are likened to
“passports for software: proof of identity for programs crossing
37. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 41 (stating that Stuxnet’s designers
expected “the frequency drives to be running between 807 Hz and 1210 Hz”); Gross,
supra note 2, at 158 (noting that Stuxnet checks to see if the PLC component is
operating under specific conditions).
38. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 2 (noting that Stuxnet’s goal is to modify
code on the Siemens PLCs); Gross, supra note 2, at 158 (stating that if the conditions
are met, Stuxnet delivers its “rogue code”).
39. See William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Worm in Iran Was Perfect for Sabotaging
Nuclear Centrifuges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at A1 (“Stuxnet does its damage by
making quick changes in the rotational speed of motors, shifting them rapidly up and
down.”); FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 43 (“Stuxnet sabotages the system by
slowing down or speeding up the motor to different rates at different times.”).
40. Broad & Sanger, supra note 39.
41. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that Stuxnet caused the PLCs
to change the centrifuges’ rotational frequencies).
42. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 24 (noting that Stuxnet installs both
windows and PLC rootkits); Definition of Rootkit, PC MAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/
encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=root+kit&i=55733,00.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
43. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 49 (“Stuxnet records the previous
operating frequencies for the frequency controllers. This data is played back . . . during
the sabotage routines.”); Broad et al., supra note 4 (stating that because of the rootkit
Stuxnet made it “appear[ed] that everything was operating normally while the
centrifuges were actually tearing themselves apart.”).
44. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 24 (describing how Stuxnet contains an
authentic certificate); Gross, supra note 2, at 155 (comparing Stuxnet’s use of an
authentic digital signature to a teenager’s use of a fake ID to get into a bar).
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the border between one machine and the next.” 45 Initially,
Stuxnet’s signature was obtained from Realtek Semiconductor
Corporation (“Realtek”), an electronics manufacturer. 46 This
signature enabled Stuxnet to gain access to computers it would
otherwise have been prevented from infecting.47
The features described in this Section make Stuxnet a
remarkable piece of malware.48 It is a worm that, when released
into any network in the world, can seek out a well-defined target,
deliver its payload, and then hide the fact that it caused any
damage. 49 Indeed, Stuxnet has been called a “self-directed
stealth drone.”50 Not only does Stuxnet locate specific targets,
but it also limits its destructive forces to those targets in a way
that kinetic weapons cannot.51 In essence, Stuxnet is a computer
worm that can perform the function of a traditional kinetic
weapon, only with greater precision.52 It represents a major new
development in warfare technology.53

45. Gross, supra note 2, at 155.
46. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 24 (“The [Stuxnet] driver file is a
digitally signed with a legitimate Realtek digital certificate.”); MATROSOV ET AL., supra
note 28, at 13 (noting that Stuxnet was initially signed with a certificate from Realtek
Semiconductor Corporation (“Realtek”)).
47. See Gross, supra note 2, at 155 (stating that the Realtek signature was the
equivalent of “carrying a cops badge”); Zetter, supra note 2 (explaining that Stuxnet
used the Realtek signature “in order to fool systems into thinking the malware was a
trusted program from Realtek”).
48. See Ken Dilanian, Iran and the Era of Cyber War, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, at A1
(calling Stuxnet “game-changing”); Cyberwar: The Meaning of Stuxnet, supra note 12
(noting that computer security experts have described Stuxnet as “amazing,”
“groundbreaking,” and “impressive”).
49. See Gross, supra note 2, at 159 (stating that Stuxnet can hide “both its
existence and its effects until after the damage is done”); see also supra notes 28–53 and
accompanying text (describing how Stuxnet works generally).
50. Gross, supra note 2, at 159.
51. See Dilanian, supra note 48 (quoting White House terrorism advisor Richard
Clarke as calling Stuxnet “precision-guided munition”); Cyberwar: The Meaning of
Stuxnet, supra note 12 (noting Stuxnet’s obvious appeal to military advisors because of
its ability to disable a specific target while avoiding a traditional kinetic military strike).
52. See Dilanian, supra note 48 (“The Stuxnet worm seems to have inflicted
significant damage on Iran’s nuclear program, cyber experts say, with none of the
dangerous repercussions of a U.S. or Israeli airstrike, at least so far.”); Cyberwar: The
Meaning of Stuxnet, supra note 12 (calling Stuxnet a “cyber missile”).
53. Gross, supra note 2 (“Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war”); Cyberwar: The
Meaning of Stuxnet, supra note 12 (referring to Stuxnet as a “new kind of cyber attack”).
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C. Stuxnet’s Development and Deployment
As set forth in Section B, Stuxnet is an extremely unique
piece of malware. The identity of its creators, however, is
unclear. To substantiate the theories that allege that Israel and
the United States created and deployed Stuxnet, this Section
examines Stuxnet’s distinguishing characteristics and other
pieces of evidence relating to its development and deployment.
The limitation of Stuxnet’s payload delivery to such a small,
well-defined group of computers is unusual in malware. 54
Typically, malware designers attempt to infect and cause harm
to as many computers as possible.55 A worm that “activates” only
when specific parameters are met runs contrary to the objectives
of most malware programmers. 56 This specialization alone
differentiates Stuxnet from most pieces of malware.
The worm also remarkably contains four “zero-day”
Windows hacks, as well as a “zero-day” hack of the Siemens’
SCADA software.57 A zero-day hack exposes a vulnerability in a
piece of software that was previously unknown to the
developer.58 Since most computers worldwide run Windows, a
54. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the uniqueness of a
narrow range of payload delivery in malware).
55. See, e.g., Stefanie Hoffman, Conficker Worm Spreads Fast, Infects Millions, CRN,
(Jan. 23, 2009, 5:17 PM), http://www.crn.com/news/security/212902319/confickerworm-spreads-fast-infects-millions.htm (stating that the Conficker worm has infected at
“least nine million” computers); Eric Larkin, Protecting Against the Rampant Conficker
Worm, PCWORLD (Jan. 16, 2009, 2:31 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/157876/
protecting_against_the_rampant_conficker_worm.html (noting that in less than four
days the number of Conficker infections leapt from 2.4 million to 8.9 million). For
example, the Conficker worm spread indiscriminately and delivered its payload to
more than nine million computers worldwide. See Hoffman, supra.
56. See, e.g., Sharon Gaudin, Storm Worm Botnet More Powerful Than Top
(Sept.
6,
2007,
3:50
PM),
Supercomputers,
INFORMATIONWEEK,
http://www.informationweek.com/news/201804528 (stating that the Storm Botnet is
used for attacks that snowball, becoming more effective as additional computers are
infected). An example of a more typical piece of malware is the Storm Botnet worm
that may have infected up to fifty million computers in 2007, with each infection
helping to accomplish its purpose of creating a network of “zombie computers.” See id.
57. See Murchu, supra note 3 (stating that Stuxnet uses four zero-day
vulnerabilities and that was the first time Symantec has encountered this kind of
malware); see also FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 55 (“[Stuxnet] exploit[s] four 0-day
vulnerabilities.”); Zetter, supra note 2 (noting the presence of four zero-day hacks).
58. See BYRON ACOHIDO & JON SWARTZ, ZERO DAY THREAT 5 (2008) (explaining
that a zero-day threat “refers to a virus designed to take advantage of a security hole for
which no patch exists. No patch exists because the bad guys discover the hole”); Zetter,
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zero-day Windows hack is quite valuable. 59 As such,
programmers almost never use more than one in a single piece
of malware.60
The presence of four zero-day hacks speaks to the
extremely high value of Stuxnet’s target, the Iranian nuclear
facility. A zero-day hack can only be effectively utilized one time;
once the malware is distributed and the computing world
becomes aware of the zero-day hack, updates from the software
manufacturer quickly eliminate the vulnerability. 61 Since the
four zero-day hacks have an estimated value of hundreds of
thousands of dollarsexcluding the value of the Realtek
signatureit would only seem logical to use them together in
Stuxnet only if the target was extremely valuable to the
attacker.62
Additionally, the use of zero-day hacks demonstrates the
possibility of numerous programmers working with a substantial

supra note 2 (“[Zero-day hacks] exploit vulnerabilities in software that are yet unknown
to the software maker or antivirus vendors.”).
59. See Robert Lemos, Bug Brokers Offering Higher Bounty, SECURITYFOCUS (Jan. 23,
2007), http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11437 (noting that zero-day exploits can
sell for upwards of US$100,000); see also CHARLES MILLER, INDEP. SEC. EVALUATORS,
THE LEGITIMATE VULNERABILITIES MARKET: THE SECRETIVE WORLD OF 0-DAY EXPLOIT
SALES,
available
at
http://securityevaluators.com/files/papers/0daymarket.pdf
(estimating that the value of some exploits had reached US$250,000).
60. Miltiadis, Is Stuxnet the ‘Best’ Malware Ever?, TECH.BOX (Dec. 13, 2011),
http://www.the-techbox.com/news/is-stuxnet-the-best-malware-ever-part-13/ (calling
Stuxnet’s use of multiple zero-day hacks “unprecedented”). Zero-day hacks also are
quite rare. See Zetter, supra note 2 (noting that of the millions of pieces of malware
developed each year, fewer than a dozen exploit zero-day vulnerabilities).
61. See, e.g., Adobe Issues Patch for ‘Critical’ Zero-Day Vulnerability in Flash, GOV’T
COMPUTER NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011), http://gcn.com/articles/2011/09/22/adobe-flashpatch-zero-day-exploit.aspx (explaining that when Adobe learned of a zero-day exploit
they issued an “out of cycle” patch to eliminate the vulnerability); see also John E.
Dunn, ‘Duqu’ Zero-Day Windows Flaw Patched This Week, ITWORLD (Dec. 13, 2011, 9:48
AM), http://www.itworld.com/operating-systems/232703/duqu-zero-day-windows-flawpatched-week (reporting that Microsoft reacted to a zero-day exploited by the so-called
Duqu malware by patching their software about a month later).
62. See Zetter, supra note 2 (“[G]iven that they were using four zero-days to do it,
the targets had to be high-value.”). There is no doubt that the United States considers
disabling Iran’s nuclear program to be extremely valuable. In 2007, President George
W. Bush said that a nuclear-armed Iran could mean “World War III.” See, e.g., Holly
Rozenkrantz & Roger Runningen, Bush Says a Nuclear-Armed Iran Risks ‘World War III,’
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 17, 2007, 11:39 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aNfIRh0cknik&refer=home (reporting President George W. Bush’s
concern that a nuclear-armed Iran constituted a “threat to world peace”).
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budget.63 Some analysts have estimated that it could have taken
five to ten programmers upwards of six months to create
Stuxnet. 64 Put simply, Stuxnet is a significant technological
achievement and represents the work of a well-financed, wellconnected, and well-organized group of programmers, not a few
individual hackers.65 The novelty of the worm, combined with
attack mechanisms that targeted several previously unknown
vulnerabilities in Windows, has led to Stuxnet’s description as
“one of the most sophisticated pieces of malware ever.”66
While this evidence establishes that Stuxnet’s developers
were both well-financed and well-organized, there is additional
evidence supporting the theory that Israel and the United States
were involved. First, it is hard to imagine another purpose for
such a highly specialized piece of malware. The narrow range of
circumstances in which Stuxnet would deploy its payload makes
it unlikely that Stuxnet had another purpose besides destroying
nuclear centrifuges. 67 Second, the governments’ responses to
news of the worm are suspicious; when Israeli officials were
asked about their involvement in the worm they “broke[] into
wide smiles.” 68 The United States has refused to deny
involvement in Stuxnet.69 Perhaps most convincingly, a video
tribute played at the retirement party of a former Israeli Defense

63. See infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (describing the resources
necessary to develop malware as sophisticated as Stuxnet).
64. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3 (“The full cycle may have taken six
months and five to ten core developers not counting numerous other individuals, such
as quality assurance and management.”). Others have put the number closer to thirty.
See Gross, supra note 2, at 158 (noting that as many as thirty programmers may have
worked on Stuxnet).
65. See Iran Accuses Siemens over Stuxnet Cyber Attack, TELEGRAPH (London)
(Apr. 17, 2011, 11:26 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/8457658/
Iran-accuses-Siemens-over-Stuxnet-cyber-attack.html
(noting
that
an
Iranian
commander speculated that Siemens may have given proprietary information to the US
government to aid in the development of Stuxnet); Williams, supra note 1 (positing
that the designers of Stuxnet would have needed both programming expertise and
access to tightly regulated nuclear equipment to produce malware capable of harming
Iran’s nuclear program).
66. Fildes, supra note 2.
67. See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text (describing the limits placed on
delivery of Stuxnet’s payload).
68. Broad & Sanger, supra note 39.
69. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing how US Deputy Defense
Secretary William Lynn refused to deny that the United States was involved in Stuxnet).
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Force Chief of General Staff featured references to Stuxnet as
one of the general’s operational successes.70
Traditional covert operations were probably necessary to
infect the Natanz facility’s network as well. Natanz’s control
system is a closed-network that is not connected to the
Internet.71 This means that Stuxnet would probably have needed
to infect Natanz through a removable drive or a personal
computer plugged directly into the network. 72 Alternatively,
someone could have infected a Natanz employee’s personal
computer, then waited for that employee to attach the computer
to the network and unwittingly infect the network.73
Stuxnet’s code also contains numerous commands that
appear, counterintuitively, to limit the ability of the worm to
spread. The worm contains a “self-destruct” command that will
destroy Stuxnet on June 24, 2012.74 One of the hallmarks of
Stuxnet’s code is that, once infected, a computer can only
transmit the worm to three other computers, which is a
restriction that runs contrary to the traditional objectives of
malware programmers.75 These “fail-safes” appear to be add-ons
70. See Video Links Israel to Cyber Attack on Iran, TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 16,
2011, at 17 (“The video of Lt Gen Gabi Ashkenazi’s operational successes included
references to Stuxnet . . . .”); Gross, supra note 2, at 197 (“[G]uests at a retirement
party for Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Lieutenant General Gabi Ashkenazi
watched a video tribute to his career highlights—which included a reference to
Stuxnet.”).
71. ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (“[T]he Natanz control systems are not
connected to the internet . . . .”); Kim Zetter, Surveillance Footage and Code Clues Indicate
Stuxnet Hit Iran, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2011, 6:03 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2011/02/isis-report-stuxnet (“Natanz’s PLCs are not connected to the internet . . . .”).
72. See ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (“[Stuxnet] needed to travel on a
removable drive . . . to the Natanz control system.”); FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3
(noting that Stuxnet “may have been introduced by removable drive”).
73. See ALBRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, at 2 (speculating that Stuxnet’s controllers
could have targeted Natanz personnel’s personal computers); FALLIERE ET AL., supra
note 29, at 3 (hypothesizing that Stuxnet may have spread through a ”willing or
unknowing third party”).
74. See Kim Zetter, New Clues Point to Israel As Author of Blockbuster Worm, or Not,
WIRED (Oct. 1, 2010, 3:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/stuxnetdeconstructed (“An apparent ‘kill’ date in the code indicates that Stuxnet is designed
to stop working June 24, 2012.”); see also Schneier, supra note 10 (stating Stuxnet has a
self-destruct date of June 24, 2012).
75. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 29 (noting that once Stuxnet infects
three removable drives, the original is deleted); Gross, supra note 2, at 196 (“The USBspreading code, for instance, limits the number of devices that each infected device can
itself infect. (The limit is three, enough to create a moderate chain reaction, but not so

2012]

EVOLVING BATTLEFIELDS

857

by programmers that are concerned about subsequent
infections by Stuxnet. 76 Former US counterterrorism czar
Richard Clarke stated Stuxnet’s code “just says lawyers all over
it.”77 As discussed later in the Note, this suggests that Stuxnet’s
programmers considered the LOAC, and designed Stuxnet to
conform to its principles.78
D. The Natanz Facility and Stuxnet’s Damage
The Natanz uranium enrichment facility is located outside
of the city of Natanz, with a large portion of the facility buried
underground.79 It runs centrifuges that spin gaseous uranium to
“separate fissile U-235 atoms from the denser U-238 atoms.”80
Uranium with higher percentages of U-235, or “enriched
uranium,” is an essential component in nuclear weapons.81 Iran
many that its effects would rage out of control.)”); supra notes 54–56 and
accompanying text (explaining that, traditionally, malware is designed to infect as
many systems as quickly as possible).
76. See Gross, supra note 2, at 196 (quoting Richard Clarke as saying that a
“responsible government . . . [would] have to prevent collateral damage”).
77. Id.
78. See infra Part III (noting that although the LOAC did not apply to Stuxnet, its
programmers gave up operational effectiveness to comply with LOAC rules).
79. See David Albright & Corey Hinderstein, Inst. Sci. & Int’l Sec., The Iranian Gas
Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Plant at Natanz: Drawing from Commercial Satellite
Images
(2003),
available
at
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/
natanz03_02.html (describing the Natanz facility as a high-security uranium
enrichment facility that includes numerous underground buildings); IAEA Envoys Visit
Iran’s Natanz Enrichment Site: Report, Reuters, Jan. 16, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/01/16/us-iran-nuclear-natanz-idUSTRE70F12F20110116 (stating that the
Natanz uranium enrichment is located underground).
80. Iran Increases Uranium Enrichment—IAEA, BBC NEWS, Aug. 10, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10925381 (stating that Natanz centrifuges
spin uranium hexafluoride gas to separate U-235 from U-238 atoms); see Iran and Syria:
Next Steps: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
(statement of Olli J. Heinonen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University) (stating that Natanz produces enriched
uranium).
81. See Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons, INT’L PANEL FISSILE MATERIALS,
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/pages_us_en/fissile/production/
production.php (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (citing INT’L PANEL FISSILE MATERIALS, 2006
GLOBAL FISSILE MATERIAL REPORT) (explaining that isolating the U-235 isotope is
essential for the production of a nuclear weapon); Mark D. Sameit, Note, Killing and
Cleaning in Combat: A Proposal to Extend the Foreign Claims Act to Long-Term Environmental
Damage, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 547, 575 (2008) (“The enriched U-235
is known as ‘enriched uranium’ and can be used in commercial or military reactors, or
as fuel for nuclear weapons.”).
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has repeatedly stated that their nuclear program is peaceful and
its only purpose is to generate nuclear power.82 US officials,
however, doubt Iran’s claims, and believe that the purpose of
the facility at Natanz is to secure weapons-grade uranium.83
As previously explained, Stuxnet was most likely designed to
destroy centrifuges at Natanz by systematically raising and
lowering their rotational speed. 84 Stuxnet seems to have
succeeded in this respect. Subsequent to the date of infection,
international inspectors reported that Iran was experiencing
severe problems with its centrifuges and that several hundred
had been shut down.85 An inspection in late 2009 revealed that
close to 1000 centrifuges had been removed from Natanz since
the previous summer.86 It appears that this has caused significant
delays to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.87
The extent of the damage done to the Iranian nuclear
program is unknown. There are reports that Iran successfully
contained much of the damage caused by Stuxnet and replaced
82. See Iran’s President Says Bush Pushing for War, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS, Sept. 19,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14911603/ns/nightly_news/t/irans-presidentsays-bush-pushing-war/ (quoting President Ahmadinejad in an interview with NBC as
saying, “[w]e are against the atomic bomb”); see also Alan Cowell & Michael Slackman,
Iran Boasts of Capacity to Make Bomb Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2010, at A4 (quoting
President Ahmadinejad as saying, “[w]hen we say we won’t build [a nuclear weapon]
that means we won’t”).
83. See Charles J. Moxley, Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review: An Ambitious Program for
Nuclear Arms Control but a Retreat from the Objective of Nuclear Disarmament, 34 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 734, 767 (2011) (noting that the Obama administration has stated it seeks to
reverse Iran’s ambition to acquire a nuclear weapon); Mark Landler, Clinton Says
Sanctions Have Stalled Iran’s Effort to Make Nuclear Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at
A4 (describing US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s concern over Iran’s effort to
acquire nuclear weapons).
84. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (describing the method by
which Stuxnet destroyed the centrifuges at Natanz).
85. See Broad & Sanger, supra note 39 (stating that reports issued by international
inspectors show Iran removed hundreds of centrifuges in 2009); Zetter, supra note 71
(explaining that surveillance footage from the United Nations showed Iranian workers
dismantling ten percent of the plant’s centrifuges).
86. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (“[W]hen international inspectors visited Natanz
in late 2009, they found that the Iranians had taken out of service a total of exactly 984
machines that had been running the previous summer.”); Zetter, supra note 2 (stating
that International Atomic Energy Agency surveillance footage at Natanz showed
between 1000 and 2000 centrifuges being replaced after the Stuxnet attack).
87. See Broad et al., supra note 4 (commenting that the destruction of centrifuges
at Natanz helped delay, but not destroy, Iran’s nuclear weapons program); Williams,
supra note 1 (stating that Iranian officials confirmed that Stuxnet had set back their
nuclear program).
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many of the broken centrifuges. 88 It is likely, however, that
Stuxnet affected the Iranian nuclear program in other ways. Iran
appears to be suffering from a shortage of certain types of
metals that are needed to run the machines, and usable metal
was lost because of Stuxnet. 89 Additionally, Stuxnet almost
certainly had a psychological effect on the Iranians; a facility
they thought to be completely secure was infected with malware
whose designers possessed a high degree of knowledge about
Natanz’s centrifuges and the facility generally.90 Finally, to be
fully rid of the worm, Iran would most likely have to replace all
the computer systems in the nuclear program, an exceedingly
difficult proposition for a country under strict trade sanctions.91
Consequently, Israeli intelligence officials delayed their
estimates for when Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon to 2015.92
This was not the first time that Western nations attempted
to hinder an Arab country’s nuclear program. In 2007, Israel
launched F-15 fighter jets to bomb a Syrian facility believed to be
an underground nuclear reactor.93 The facility was completely
88. Iran’s Centrifuges Again Enriching Uranium at Full Speed, Late 2010 Lull Attributed
to Stuxnet Computer Worm, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 9, 2011, at 20 (stating that after a
decline in production because of Stuxnet, uranium enrichment regained “full speed”);
Joby Warrick, Iran Recovered Swiftly in Wake of Cyberattack, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2011, at
A1 (stating Iran responded with an effort to “contain the damage and replace broken
parts”).
89. See DAVID ALBRIGHT ET AL., INST. SCI. & INT’L SEC., STUXNET MALWARE AND
NATANZ: UPDATE OF ISIS DECEMBER 22, 2010 REPORT 4 (2011), available at http://isisonline.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/stuxnet_update_15Feb2011.pdf (noting
that Iran is facing a shortage of raw materials to build centrifuges); Joby Warrick, Iran
‘Set Back’ on Nuclear Program, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2011, at A1 (reporting that a
shortage in materials caused Iran to construct centrifuges from an inferior type of
metal).
90. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3 (noting that “reconnaissance” was
necessary for Stuxnet’s designers to understand how PLCs were configured at the
attack site); Warrick, supra note 89 (“[Stuxnet’s] designers possessed highly detailed
knowledge of Natanz’s centrifuges and how they are interconnected . . . .”).
91. See Dilanian, supra note 48 (quoting cyber security expert Ralph Langner as
saying that replacing all the nuclear program’s computer systems would be necessary to
delete the worm and would constitute “a tall order for a country under sanctions”).
92. See Mark Landler, Clinton Urges Gulf States to Maintain Iran Sanctions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A4 (stating that Meir Dagan, an Israeli intelligence official, said
that Iran’s nuclear program will not produce a nuclear weapon before 2015); Warrick,
supra note 89 ([“Israel’s] outgoing intelligence chief estimated . . . that the Islamic
republic could not have a bomb before 2015.”).
93. See Con Coughlin, The Real Reason Why a Syria Base Was Wiped Off the Map,
TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 25, 2008, at 23 (explaining that Israeli F-15’s struck the
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destroyed, leaving only “a big hole in the desert.” 94 In
comparison, Stuxnet managed to strike only the centrifuges at
Natanz, without affecting the civilians working in the plant, or
causing damage to civilian computer systems connected to the
Natanz network.95
E.

Stuxnet’s Proliferation Outside Natanz

Stuxnet’s discovery triggered a sense of panic among many
industrial firms. Western nations, after a cursory analysis of
Stuxnet’s code, feared that the worm might attack all PLCs
worldwide. 96 Such an attack could cause the shutdown of
factories, power plants, and other facilities vital to the
functioning of civil society.97 These fears, however, were never
realized.
Because Stuxnet spreads indiscriminately, despite the
limitations described above, it has spread throughout the
globe.98 As of this moment, it is unclear how many computers
Stuxnet has infected, but a September 2010 Symantec study

Syrian facility); David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, Analysts Find Israel Struck a Syrian
Nuclear Project, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2007, at A1 (stating that Israel struck a site “analysts
judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor”).
94. Syria Complains to U.N. About Israeli Airstrike, CNN WORLD, Sept. 11, 2007,
http://articles.cnn.com/2007-09-11/world/israel.syria_1_israeli-airstrike-syrian-foreignminister-walid-syrian-government?_s=PM:WORLD (discussing the magnitude of the
destruction caused by the Israeli airstrike).
95. See infra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (detailing the lack of damage to
civilian computers); supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text (proving the lack of any
physical harm to individuals at Natanz).
96. See Gross, supra note 2, at 155 (noting that Stuxnet had “the potential to bring
industrial society to a halt”); Zetter, supra note 2 (explaining that Stuxnet’s intial
researcher’s website was “beseiged” with visits and that he “perfom[ed] a huge public
service to help protect critical infrastructures”).
97. See Gross, supra note 2, at 155 (stating that PLCs, in addition to controlling the
speed of the centrifuges at Natanz, are more commonly involved in the operation of
factories, power plants, and construction projects all over the world); Schneier, supra
note 10 (noting that PLCs control systems that operate in factories, chemical plants, oil
refineries, and nuclear power plants).
98. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 3–5 (noting that Stuxnet infected
computers in Azerbaijan, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, the United
States, and numerous others); MATROSOV ET AL., supra note 28, at 15 (citing Iran,
Indonesia, and India as the three countries with the most Stuxnet infections).
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showed over 100,000 infections worldwide. 99 The worm,
however, appears to have done little harm. Stuxnet infected only
twenty-four industrial systems outside Iran, and there have been
no documented cases, outside of the Iranian nuclear facilities, in
which Stuxnet’s payload was activated and delivered.100 As such,
there seem to be no incidents of industrial damage linked to
Stuxnet.101 At this point, Stuxnet’s main impact on the general
computing world has been limited to the nuisance of deleting
the worm off infected systems, and even that has been minor, as
Stuxnet does not replicate to a point that it inhibits computer or
network functions.102
This, however, may not be the end of the story for damage
traceable to Stuxnet. Computer-science experts warned that
Stuxnet’s code could be a model for third parties to attack other
industrial facilities and hypothesized that Stuxnet’s proliferation
has increased the risk of similar cyber attacks worldwide.103 This
hypothesis appears to have been accurate: internet-security firms
detected a “relative” of Stuxnet, one that appears to utilize
99. See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 29, at 5 (noting over 100,000 Stuxnet
infections); Zetter, supra note 2 (stating that there have been more than 100,000
Stuxnet infections).
100. See
SIMATIC
WinCC / SIMATIC
PCS
7:
Information
About
Malware / Viruses / Trojan Horses, SIEMENS INDUSTRY SERVICE & SUPPORT,
http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/llisapi.dll?func=ll&objid=43876783&
nodeid0=10805583&caller=view&lang=en&siteid=cseus&aktprim=0&
objaction=csopen&extranet=standard&viewreg=WW#Recommended_
procedure%200408 (last updated Mar. 11, 2011) (stating that a total of twenty-four
Siemens customers in the industrial sector reported infections, and that “[i]n none of
these cases did the infection have an adverse impact”).
101. See id. (noting the absence of instances in which Stuxnet had an “adverse
impact” on an industrial system); see also US Also Vulnerable to Stuxnet Virus, Official
Warns, AOL NEWS (Dec. 7, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/12/07/usalso-vulnerable-to-stuxnet-virus-official-warns/ (quoting a US Department of Homeland
Security official as saying that “it’s not clear there are [sic] any particular process within
the United States that would have triggered the software”).
102. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (noting the restrictions Stuxnet
has on self-replication).
103. See Securing Critical Infrastructure in the Age of Stuxnet: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of
Michael J. Assante, President and Chief Executive Officer, National Board of
Information Security Examiners of the United States) (stating that Stuxnet could serve
as a “blueprint for future attackers”); Ellen Nakashima, Stuxnet Malware Is Blueprint for
Computer Attacks on U.S., WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2010, at A3 (“[T]he possibility that
Stuxnet could be used by copycats, even those who don’t intend to do harm with it, is
causing concern among experts.”).
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pieces of code from Stuxnet, in October 2011.104 Called the
“Duqu” virus, this code differs substantially from Stuxnet in its
apparent goals. Duqu appears to gather data from host
computers, possibly compiling information for a future attack.105
Duqu’s authors are unknown. A third party may have acquired
Stuxnet’s code and altered it to further its own purposes, or the
original designers of Stuxnet may also have programmed
Duqu.106 The next phase of the Duqu attack is also unknown.107
F.

Assumptions for the Remainder of this Note

The facts described in Part I.A–E allude to the possibility
that Israel and the United States developed Stuxnet to target
Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. The high value of Stuxnet’s zeroday hacks, the discriminating nature of Stuxnet’s payload, the
substantial budget necessary to create Stuxnet, and statements
made by Israeli and US officials suggest that both countries
likely played a role in Stuxnet’s development and deployment.108

104. See Zulfikar Abbany, ‘Son of Stuxnet’ Hits European Computer Networks,
WELLE,
Oct.
21,
2011,
http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/
DEUTSCHE
0,,15478105,00.html (calling Duqu a “relative” of Stuxnet); Jim Finkle & Supantha
Mukherjee, Duqu Computer Virus Prompts Indian Authorities to Seize Computer Equipment,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
10/29/duqu-computer-virus-prompts_n_1065217.html (stating Duqu’s code is similar
to Stuxnet).
105. SYMANTEC SEC. RESPONSE, W32.DUQU: THE PRECURSOR TO THE NEXT
STUXNET 1 (2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/
media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_to_the_next_
stuxnet_research.pdf (“Duqu’s purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from
entities such as industrial infrastructure and system manufacturers, amongst others not
in the industrial sector, in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another
third party.”).
106. Compare id. (stating that Duqu probably came from the same author as
Stuxnet), with SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Research Team, Duqu Trojan
SECUREWORKS
(Oct.
26,
2011),
Questions
and
Answers,
DELL
http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/duqu/ (suggesting that Duqu and
Stuxnet may be unrelated).
107. See Abbany, supra note 104 (describing Duqu as “waiting” and stealing
information); Tony Bradley, Duqu: New Malware Is Stuxnet 2.0, PCWORLD (Oct. 18,
2011, 2:22 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/242114/duqu_new_
malware_is_stuxnet_20.html (speculating that Duqu may be gathering information to
launch a subsequent attack).
108. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (describing the high value of
Stuxnet’s zero-day hacks); supra notes 28–53 and accompanying text (explaining how
Stuxnet proliferates and delivers its payload); supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text
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For academic purposes, this Note assumes that to be true. All
other facts about Stuxnet, such as how the worm worked and the
damage that it did to the nuclear installations, are analyzed
based entirely on available evidence.
This Note also assumes that the LOAC applies to Stuxnet.
This is necessary to analyze whether Stuxnet violates the LOAC
and whether the LOAC properly regulates Stuxnet. In fact and
in law, however, the LOAC—which fully applies only during an
armed conflict—did not apply to Stuxnet because Israel and the
United States are not involved in an armed conflict with Iran.109
Applying the LOAC to Stuxnet is an important exercise because
there have been few, if any, other recorded cyber attacks to
which the LOAC applies. It is understandably difficult to analyze
the effectiveness of the LOAC in regulating cyber war when
there have been no instances in which it is applicable. It is
therefore worthwhile to analyze an actual event—Stuxnet—
under the LOAC, even though the requisite conditions for the
LOAC to apply were not present. This Note engages in such a
hypothetical analysis.
II. THE HISTORY AND SUBSTANCE OF LOAC PRINCIPLES
RELATING TO CYBER WAR
Despite appearing chaotic, war takes place within a legal
framework of rules.110 International law regulates the conduct of
(detailing the significant resources required to program Stuxnet); supra notes 11, 68,
70 and accompanying text (illustrating the American and Israeli reactions to Stuxnet).
109. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention) art. 2, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention] (stating
the LOAC applies during an “armed conflict” or conflict between two parties to the
treaty even if the parties have not formally recognized a state of war between them);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)
(“[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups . . . . [The LOAC] applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts . . . until a
general conclusion of peace is reached . . . .”).
110. See ROBERT KOLB & RICHARD HYDE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS 15 (2008) (“War . . . does not take place in
a vacuum of legal rules.”); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW? (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
what_is_ihl.pdf (stating that the LOAC is a set of rules that “limit the effects of armed
conflict”).
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belligerents during an armed conflict, irrespective of the legality
of the initial use of force. 111 Historically, these rules were
referred to by the Latin expression jus in bello, which means the
rules that regulate warfare. 112 Today, they are called the
LOAC.113
There is no specific provision in the LOAC stating that
LOAC restrictions apply to the use of cyber weapons.114 There
appears, however, to be a consensus among scholars and nations
that LOAC principles do apply to cyber war.115 As discussed
below, the LOAC developed over many centuries and is codified
primarily in the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and
Additional Protocols. 116 These treaties were signed in 1907,
1949, and 1977 respectively. 117 As such, cyber weapons are
111. See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1276 (5th ed. 2009)
(explaining that traditionally, under the laws of war, “deviations from the laws of war
. . . [are] violations of international law”); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
1167 (6th ed. 2008) (stating that international law “seeks to regulate the conduct of
hostilities”); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 368 (showing that the LOAC concerns itself with
what is and is not permissible during an armed conflict “irrespective of the legality of
the initial resort to force by the belligerents”).
112. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110 (“[J]us in bello means the rules relating to
the conduct of warfare.”); SHAW, supra note 111 (stating that jus in bello regulates the
conduct of hostilities).
113. See Dep’t of Def., Directive 2311.01E: DoD Law of War Program (2006)
(designating the term “law of armed conflict” as the official term used by the US
Department of Defense to describe “international law that regulates the conduct of
armed hostilities”). The term “international humanitarian law” is sometimes used for
and is interchangeable with the LOAC. See, e.g., Nicholas Rostow, Wall of Reason: Alan
Dershowitz v. the International Court of Justice, 71 ALB. L. REV. 953, 980 n.92 (2008)
(asserting that the term “laws of war” is “[a]lso known, interchangeably, as
‘international humanitarian law’ or ‘the law of armed conflict’”).
114. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 1304 (noting that whether the
LOAC applies to cyber war remains to be resolved); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 368
(“[T]here is no provision in any humanitarian law instrument that directly addresses
CNA . . . .”).
115. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 22, at 1187 (“The law of war clearly applies to the
use of CNA in armed conflict.”); Schmitt, supra note 21, at 375 (“[C]omputer network
attacks are subject to humanitarian law if they are part and parcel of either a classic
conflict or a “cyber war” in which injury, death, damage or destruction are intended or
foreseeable.”). The official US position is that the LOAC applies to CNAs. See OFFICE
OF GEN. COUNSEL, DEPT. OF DEF., AN ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES IN
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 8 (1999) (stating that the use of cyber weapons to “cause
injury, death, damage, and destruction” will be judged by applying the LOAC).
116. See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text (describing the primary
sources of the LOAC).
117. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]; First Geneva
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regulated by rules created at times in which cyber war was either
unimaginable or confined to the realms of science fiction;
indeed, the earliest cyber weapons appeared in 1970s sciencefiction novels.118 Academics have therefore questioned whether
these rules are capable of effectively regulating cyber war.119
Scholars generally divide into two camps on whether
current LOAC rules adequately regulate cyber war: those that
believe that current LOAC rules can adequately address cyber
war and those that believe new treaties will be necessary to
regulate it effectively.120 Governments, by and large, have argued
that new rules are not necessary to regulate cyber war.121 To
determine whether current LOAC rules adequately regulate
cyber war, one must first ask what the purposes of the applicable
rules are. If the rules, as applied to Stuxnet, accomplish those
policy objectives, then Stuxnet represents one piece of evidence
that current LOAC paradigms adequately regulate cyber war.
There are two primary policy purposes behind all jus in bello
rules. First, the LOAC aims to lower the level of violence that
occurs during an armed conflict. 122 This is most easily
Convention, supra note 109; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (Second
Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter AP I].
118. See, e.g., JOHN BRUNNER, THE SHOCKWAVE RIDER (1975) (describing how a
computer worm—called a “tapeworm” in the novel—is used to alter data kept by a
government entity).
119. See, e.g., Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public
International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 274 (1996); Schmitt, supra note 21.
120. See supra note 22 (comparing two differing positions on the adequacy of
current LOAC rules).
121. See Schaap, supra note 19, at 124 (stating that governments have “resisted
calls to craft new rules of international law to govern attacks on or by computers”);
Duncan B. Hollis, Rules of Cyberwar?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8. 2007, at A15 (noting
government hesitancy to design new rules to regulate cyber war).
122. See I MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR? CASES, DOCUMENTS AND TEACHING
MATERIALS ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN HUMANITARIAN LAW 81–82 (2d ed. 2006)
(noting that a goal of the LOAC is “limiting the violence” of the armed conflict);
Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare, 2 YALE HUM.
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demonstrated in rules that “prohibit [the] use of particular
weapons or forbid the creation of unnecessary suffering.” 123
Second, the LOAC attempts to protect individuals who are not
participating in the conflict from suffering physical harm or
damage to their property. 124 Part III of this Note explores
whether the LOAC furthers these objectives when applied to
Stuxnet.
A. History of the LOAC
Throughout the majority of history, war was mostly devoid
of formal rules regulating the conduct of participants.125 There
is evidence, however, that some ancient civilizations regulated
combatants’ actions on the battlefield and their treatment of
non-combatants and prisoners to some extent.126 Most of these
rules stemmed from religious principles that called for
compassion in certain situations. 127 Compared with the
explosion of LOAC rules in recent centuries, however, these
rules were sparse.128
The 1862 book, A Memory of Solferino (“Memory”), written by
the Swiss businessman Henri Dunant, is cited as the intellectual
birth of the modern LOAC.129 After witnessing more than 40,000
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 145 (1999) (“The first [LOAC goal] is a desire to ratchet down
the level of violence that occurs in armed conflict . . . .”).
123. Schmitt, supra note 122, at 145.
124. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 15 (stating that the LOAC is necessary to
protect the potential civilian victims of war, as well as wounded, sick, or prisoner
combatants); Schmitt, supra note 122, at 145 (stating that the LOAC’s second purpose
is to “shield those who are not directly participating in the conflict from its effects”).
125. See INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 151 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing early war
rules and noting that victors in a war typically used “barbaric practices”).
126. See id. (noting the Egyptians had agreements regarding the treatment of
prisoners of war); GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: AN
OPERATIONAL APPROACH (forthcoming May 2012) (manuscript ch. 2, at 2–3) (noting
that the “Just War” theory used by Christians in the Roman Empire had beneficial
effects on the practice of war, at least when both sides were Christian).
127. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 2–3 (discussing religious belief as a
basis for early laws regulating war).
128. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 39 (explaining that, as time passed, the
number of LOAC regulations increased); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 3
(noting the lack of a “comprehensive set of guidelines” prior to the 18th century).
129. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 111, at 1168 (noting that the law began developing
in the middle of the nineteenth century thanks to Henri Dunant’s writing); CORN ET
AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 4 (crediting Dunant’s writing as the impetus for the First
Geneva Convention).
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wounded soldiers left to die after a massive battle between
Austrian, French, and Sardinian forces, Dunant wrote Memory in
an attempt to advocate for the formation of some inviolate
“international principle” that would give legal protection to
wounded military personnel. 130 Dunant’s proposals eventually
prompted the formation of the First Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded Armies in the
Field, which provided certain forms of protection to soldiers
injured in battle.131
The LOAC continued to grow during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, most notably through treaties. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 created laws regulating the means and
methods of war, while the Geneva Conventions of 1949
expanded on principles designed to protect individuals not
participating in the hostilities. 132 In 1977, the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (“AP I”) supplemented existing regulations under the
Geneva Conventions. 133 AP I updated principles limiting the
means and methods of war for parties to an armed conflict.134 It
also codified principles that limited attacks to military
objectives.135
130. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 37–38 (depicting how Dunant witnessed
40,000 wounded soldiers left to die on the battlefield after the battle of Solferino);
CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 4 (stating that witnessing these horrors inspired
Dunant to write A Memory of Solferino).
131. See SHAW, supra note 111, at 1168 (commenting that as a result of Dunant’s
writing, the First Geneva Convention was adopted); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, at 4
(“[Dunant’s] suggestions were taken up by others, and led to the formation of . . . the
first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
Armies in the Field, which among other things provided for use of the red cross symbol
to distinguish hospitals, ambulances and evacuation parties.”).
132. See, e.g., Hague Convention IV, supra note 117, art. 23(e) (prohibiting
weapons “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering”); Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 117, art. 3(1) (stating that “[p]ersons taking no active part in the
hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances be treated humanely”).
133. See AP I, supra note 117, art. 1(3) (stating that the Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (“AP I”) supplements the Geneva Conventions and
applies in the same circumstances).
134. See, e.g., id. art. 57(2) (articulating the principle of proportionality).
135. See id. art. 48 (“Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objectives and military
objectives . . . .”).
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B.

LOAC Sources

International law can be found in several different sources
that are enumerated in Article 38(1) of the International Court
of Justice statute, which is recognized as the definitive statement
on the sources of international law.136 As defined in the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, these sources are: (1)
international treaties, (2) customary international law, (3)
general principles of law, and (4) judicial decisions and
publications.137 The remainder of this Section focuses on treaties
and customary law, as cyber war principles are predominantly
drawn from these sources.
1. Treaties
Treaties are written agreements through which nations
legally bind themselves to behave in a particular way. 138
Although a comparatively modern method for creating LOAC
rules, the number of LOAC treaties has exploded over the last
century, making treaties one of the first places to find the
LOAC.139 Some scholars consider treaties to be superior to other
sources of international law, including customary law, because
they reflect the express consent of the treaty signatories.140

136. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (7th ed.
2008) (noting that Article 38 is “regarded as a “complete statement of the sources of
international law”); see also DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 55 (beginning an
explanation of the sources of international law with Article 38).
137. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
138. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 13 (stating that treaties are binding on
parties to them).
139. See DETTER, supra note 125, at 151–52 (explaining that although seventeenth
century treaties regulating armed conflict exist, prohibitions on the use of force date
back to 1400 BC); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 2–6 (citing the existence of the
LOAC “since antiquity”); see also DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 1277 (noting the
importance of Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocols and
stating that the treaties have received “widespread multilateral adherence”); KOLB &
HYDE, supra note 110, at 40–41 (positing that important recent developments in the law
of conflict are the Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocols,
all of which are treaties).
140. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 111, at 94 (“For many writers, treaties constitute
the most important sources of international law . . . .”); Juliana Murray, Assessing
Allegations: Judicial Evaluation of Testimonial Evidence in International Tribunals, 10 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 769, 771 (2010) (“Treaties are also widely recognized by scholars as a valid
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Only nations that are parties to a particular treaty are
bound by the treaty itself. 141 In addition to creating law,
however, treaties are also capable of codifying existing law.142
Courts may therefore look to treaties to express principles of
customary law that are applicable to states not party to the treaty
in question.143 As explained below, this is particularly important
to Israel and the United States, who are not parties to AP I, one
of the more important post-World War II treaties.144
2. Custom
Customary law is an important source of the LOAC.145 In
fact, without a treaty on point, customary law is frequently the
only source of law that addresses a particular LOAC topic.146 For
a rule of law to apply to states through “international custom,”
the behavior must be a “practice accepted as law.”147 Customary
law therefore has two requirements: (1) demonstrated state
source of international law that may in some circumstances be superior to custom,
when treaties can more clearly reflect the parties’ specific intentions.”).
141. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 13 (“[T]reaties are in principle binding
only on parties.”); SHAW, supra note 111, at 95 (explaining that treaties create rules that
are binding upon the parties).
142. See DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 124 (noting that the Vienna
Convention was invoked even prior to its entry into force because it was “largely
declaratory of customary international law”); SHAW, supra note 111, at 95 (“[W]here
treaties reflect customary law then non-parties are bound, not because it is a treaty
provision but because it reaffirms a rule or rules of customary international law.”).
143. See Rebecca Crootof, Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the
Charming Betsy Cannon, 120 YALE L.J. 1784, 1798 (2011) (explaining that US courts
often look to treaties as evidence of customary law regardless of whether the United
States is a party to the treaty); Eric W. Sievers, Transboundary Jurisdiction and Watercourse
Law: China, Kazakhstan, and the Irtysh, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 14 (2002) (stating that
customary law “can be gleaned from a variety of sources,” including treaties).
144. See Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare? Part I: Defender Duties
Under International Humanitarian Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425, 430 (2011) (noting that
Israel and the United States continue their refusal to ratify AP I); List of Signatories to AP
I, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/WebSign?
ReadForm&id=470&ps=P (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) (indicating that Israel and the
United States are not parties to AP I). AP I is particularly important to this Note
because it codifies the principles of distinction, discrimination, and proportionality.
145. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 51 (explaining that customary law is one
of the main sources of the LOAC); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 18 (stating
that customary law is an “important source of the [LOAC]”).
146. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 18 (stating that customary law “may
be the only source” of law on a particular LOAC topic).
147. ICJ Statute, supra note 137, art. 38(1)(b).
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practice, and (2) a subjective belief by the state that they are
under a duty of law to follow the state practice.148 That a state
behaves in a particular way is therefore not sufficient to form
customary international law; there must also be a subjective
belief, termed opinio juris, on the part of the state that they had a
legal duty to behave that way.149
For a custom to constitute “state practice,” it must be of
sufficient (1) duration, (2) uniformity, and (3) generality
amongst the states.150 There is no specific length of time that a
practice must have existed for there to be sufficient duration.151
Frequently, the length of time depends upon the type of
practice in question.152 In more modern or dynamic fields, rules
can develop quickly. 153 In more established fields of law,
customary law is slower to develop.154 The custom need not be
followed without fail, but needs to be of a consistent nature

148 . See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 7–8 (breaking “practice” down into
elements of duration, uniformity, and generality, and describing opinio juris as a
separate and necessary element of international custom); DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note
111, at 59 (explaining that custom has “two distinct elements: (1) ‘general practice’
and (2) its acceptance as law [i.e. opinio juris]”).
149. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 111, at 59 (noting the opinio juris element of
customary law); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 2, at 19 (“Thus, the mere fact that
States may engage in a practice (or not engage in a practice) is not enough to indicate
that it required as a matter of customary law. States also must consider the practice or
its omission to be a legal requirement.”).
150. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 7–8 (breaking the “state practice”
requirement into duration, uniformity, and generality of the practice); Anguel
Anastassov, Are Nuclear Weapons Illegal? The Role of Public International Law and the
International Court of Justice, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 65, 79 (2010) (noting the general
criteria for “state practice” is duration, uniformity, and generality).
151. See SHAW, supra note 111, at 76 (stating that the time necessary can vary from
“time immemorial” to a matter of decades).
152. Compare SHAW, supra note 111, at 78 (stating that the law on airspace
developed quickly following the invention of manned aircraft), with Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 686–700 (1900) (analyzing examples of state practice as far back as 1403
in an effort to establish state practice for customary laws regulating civilian fishing
boats during a time of war).
153. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 7 (“[R]ules relating to airspace and the
continental shelf have emerged from fairly quick maturing of practice.”). See generally
Benjamin Langille, Note, It’s “Instant Custom”: How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 145 (2003) (arguing
that “instant custom” formed in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon).
154. See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686–700 (examining 600 years of history
to establish customary law in regards to fishermen).
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throughout the history of the practice.155 Finally, the practice
must be “widespread and representative” to satisfy the
“generality” requirement.156 Once the “state practice” element is
established, courts examine the lens through which the state
views its own behavior. The practice will only constitute
customary law if the state also satisfies the opinio juris
requirement.157
C. Relevant LOAC Principles
There are two cardinal principles of the LOAC: military
necessity and humanity.158 The principle of military necessity is
articulated in the preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaration—
the first formal agreement prohibiting the use of certain
weapons in war—which states, “the only legitimate object which
States should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken
the military forces of the enemy.”159 The principle is further
illuminated in the United States Air Force manual, which states
that military necessity has four basic elements: (1) that force is
regulated; (2) that force is necessary to achieve as quickly as
possible the partial or complete submission of the adversary;
(3) that the force is no greater than needed to achieve this; and
(4) that it is not otherwise prohibited.160 The principle therefore
requires that a belligerent use only such force as is necessary to
overpower the enemy and result in the enemy’s surrender.161
155. See id. at 689 (noting that the practice had been violated by the French in a
few instances); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27) (“It is not to be expected that in the practice of
States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect . . . .”).
156. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 73
(Feb. 20).
157. See S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7)
(noting that only if the state was “conscious of a duty” could there be customary
international law); BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 7–8 (describing opinio juris as a
necessary element of international custom).
158. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 4.
159. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29–Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil
(ser. 1) 474, translated and reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 101, 102
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d rev. ed. 1988).
160. U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, AFP 110-31, at 1-5 to 1-6
(1976).
161. See T.E. HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND 12 (1908) (stating that only
actions indispensable for securing the submission of the enemy are permitting under
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The principle of humanity places a prohibition upon
undertakings that might otherwise be justified under only the
principle of military necessity.162
These two cardinal principles provide the foundation from
which all LOAC rules are drawn. The principles are somewhat
abstract in nature, however, and require additional principles to
more effectively “implement” the twin goals of military necessity
and humanity. 163 The primary implementation principles for
military necessity are the principles of distinction and
proportionality.164 Similar to, but conceptually different from,
the principle of distinction, is the implementing principle of
“discrimination.”165 These principles are described more fully in
Part II.C.1–3 below. The implementation principles for
“humanity” are the principles of “humane treatment and the
prohibition against the infliction of unnecessary suffering.”166
This Note focuses on the principles of distinction,
discrimination, and proportionality.167 A fact-sensitive inquiry is
required to determine whether Stuxnet violated these principles
and whether Stuxnet was properly regulated. While humane
treatment and the prohibition on unnecessary suffering are
obviously relevant to cyber law—it is possible that a cyber attack

the principle of military necessity); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 8 (“Military
necessity supplies the authority to employ the means necessary to bring an enemy to
submission.”).
162. See A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 7 (2d ed. 2004) (“Humanity is,
therefore, a guiding principle that puts a brake on undertakings which might otherwise
be justified by the principle of military necessity.”); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4,
at 9 (“[A]uthority derived from the contemporary principle of military necessity is not
absolute, but is instead qualified by humanitarian obligations.”).
163. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 46–47 (noting that beneath the
principles of military necessity and humanity are “a series of more concrete and
operational principles”); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 11 (describing the
necessity of these “implementing principles”).
164. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 4 (“Complementing the principle of
military necessity are the principles of military objective and proportionality.”).
165. See infra Part II.C.2 (describing the principle of discrimination).
166. CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 4.
167. For a similar analysis of the targetability of the Natanz facility under the
principle of distinction, see generally Brian L. Bengs, Legal Constraints upon the Use of a
Tactical Nuclear Weapon Against the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 323 (2008).
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could cause physical harm to humans—Stuxnet injured no one
and therefore does not violate either principle.168
Part III of this Note hypothetically applies these principles
to Israel and the United States, so it is also necessary to briefly
discuss how the rules apply to those countries. As the following
Sections explain, all three principles constitute “customary
international law” that are also codified in AP I.169 Although
neither Israel nor the United States has ratified AP I, distinction,
discrimination, and proportionality are widely recognized as
principles of customary law with AP I merely “restating” the
rule.170 The principles are therefore applicable to all states, even
those that never properly ratified the Geneva Convention. Thus,
Israel and the United States are legally bound to follow these
principles.
1. Distinction
The basic premise of distinction is described in Article 48 of
AP I, which states: “Parties to [a] conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”171
Distinction therefore has two primary elements: (1) combatants
must distinguish military individuals, items, and objectives from
civilians and civilian property, and (2) once this distinction has
been made, commanders must direct their operations only

168. See supra Part I.D–E (describing the effects of Stuxnet and highlighting the
lack of physical injury).
169. See infra Part II.C.1–3.
170. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks
at the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and
the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 419, 422–29 (1987) (explaining the articles of AP I that the United States
considers customary law and therefore is bound to follow); Matthew D. Thurlow, Note,
Protecting Cultural Property in Iraq: How American Military Policy Comports with International
Law, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 155 (2005) (noting that the United States is
bound by customary law and that AP I codifies customary law); supra note 144 and
accompanying text (indicating that Israel and the United States are not parties to AP
I).
171. AP I, supra note 117, art. 48.
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against combatants and military objectives.172 The rule therefore
provides a workable means for commanders to implement the
principle of necessity.173
Distinction can be further broken down into two parallel
but distinct aspects: first, distinguishing between civilians and
combatants, and second, distinguishing between military objects
and civilian property. The first aspect of distinction is
inapplicable to Stuxnet because no persons were targeted by the
attack.174 The second aspect of distinction applies to Stuxnet
because the worm targeted physical objects. 175 This Section
therefore addresses only the second aspect of distinction.
While Article 48 of AP I states the basic rule of distinction,
Articles 49 through 56 articulate more specific rules used in its
application.176 The prohibition against attacking civilian objects
is described in Article 52(1) of AP I: “[C]ivilian objects shall not
be the object of attack or reprisals.”177 It further defines “civilian
objects” as “all objects which are not military objectives.”178 One
must therefore determine whether an object is a “military
objective” to determine if it is a valid target.
The test for whether an object or facility is a targetable
“military objective” is (1) whether the object makes an effective
military contribution, and (2) whether targeting that object
results in a definite military advantage.179 These elements are

172. See David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POL’Y 87, 98 (2010) (“‘Distinction’ . . . requires that combatants be distinguished from
noncombatants and that military objectives be distinguished from protected property
or protected places.”); see also ROGERS, supra note 162, at 7 (“[W]ar is to be waged
against the enemy’s armed forces, not against its civilian population. Attacks are to be
directed at military targets, not at civilian objects.”)
173. See ROGERS, supra note 162, at 7 (noting that the principle of distinction
follows from the principle of necessity); see also KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 125
(“Underlying [the rule of distinction] is the principle that, even in an armed conflict,
the only legitimate military action is that which is aimed at weakening the military
potential of the enemy.”).
174. See supra Part I.D–E (noting that Stuxnet harmed only property).
175. See supra Part I.D–E (describing the impact of Stuxnet on the Iranian nuclear
program and on computers worldwide).
176. See AP I, supra note 117, arts. 49–56.
177. Id. art. 52(1).
178. Id.
179. Id. art. 52(2); see KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 125 (bifurcating the
“military objective” analysis into whether the target makes an effective military
contribution and whether the planned attack results in a military advantage).
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determined by considering the object’s “nature, location,
purpose or use.” 180 The AP I commentary explains that
“potential or indeterminate advantages” do not meet the
standard for a “definite” military advantage.181 If the object does
make an effective military contribution, usually discernable from
the object’s purpose, and destroying or disabling that object
results in a definite military advantage, then the object is
targetable under the principle of distinction. 182 If the object
does not meet these criteria, then Article 52(3) creates a
presumption that the object is civilian property and not a valid
target.183
The fact that an installation is not technically considered
part of the military does not mean that it cannot lawfully be
targeted; if the target makes a military contribution and its
destruction would result in a definite military advantage, then
the facility is legally targetable despite its official designation as a
nonmilitary structure.184 For example, munitions plants always
have been an acceptable target under the principle of
distinction regardless of whether they were controlled by the
military or by civilians.185 Facilities with dual purposes, such as
power plants that service both civilian and military installations,
also may be an acceptable target under the principle of
distinction.186
The amorphousness of the test for what constitutes a valid
“military objective” renders few examples of targets that will be

180. AP I, supra note 117, art. 52(2).
181. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949, at 636 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter AP I COMMENTARY].
182. AP I, supra note 117, art. 52.
183. Id. art. 52(3) (stating that in cases of doubt, commanders should presume
that the target is civilian property).
184. See id. art. 52 (lacking any language indicating that an object’s “official”
status as nonmilitary has any bearing on the distinction analysis).
185. See, e.g., ROGERS, supra note 162, at 18 (explaining that a munitions factory is
so important that the death of most civilians working there is not disproportionate);
Kenneth B. Brown, Counter-Guerilla Operations: Does the Law of War Proscribe Success?, 44
NAVAL L. REV. 123, 155 n.140 (1997) (noting that even if civilians were killed in an
attack on a munitions plant it would not necessarily violate the LOAC).
186. See, e.g., 1 RICHARD T. REYNOLDS, HEART OF THE STORM: THE GENESIS OF THE
AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAQ 54 (1995) (stating that power plants were frequently
targeted by the US military during the Gulf War).
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valid in all situations. 187 Commentators have noted that the
increased reliance of militaries upon a state’s industrial facilities
has made the distinction between civilian and military objects
less well-defined and, perhaps, less important.188 Even during
the height of World War II, military leaders still espoused the
principle of distinction as important; in 1938, British Prime
Minister Neville Chamberlain stated to the House of Commons
that “targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate
military objectives and must be capable of identification.”189 The
view that distinction is no longer valid law also fundamentally
confuses the existence of the principle with its efficacy; just as
individuals break criminal laws, nations can violate established
LOAC principles without destroying the rule itself.190 Despite the
alleged decline in importance of the rule of distinction, the
principle remains a fundamental part of the LOAC.
For a commander to be in compliance with the principle of
distinction and Article 48 of AP I, he does not need to be
“correct” in his decision about the site’s targetability; he need
only take “reasonable precautions” in reaching his decision that
the target is legal.191 He also must do “everything feasible” to
verify that the target is not a civilian object and he must take “all
feasible precautions” in choosing the means and methods of
attack in order to minimize or avoid damage to civilian

187. KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 130 (“The modern LOAC has abandoned
any attempt to provide a list of [objects that are military objectives], even a nonexhaustive, illustrative one.”); AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 181, at 1997–99 (noting
that lawmakers’ attempts to create a list of targets that constitute “military objectives”
were unsuccessful).
188. Mika Nishimura Hayashi, The Principle of Civilian Protection and Contemporary
Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CONSTRAINTS ON THE CONTEMPORARY
USE OF MILITARY FORCE 105, 109 (Howard M. Hensel ed., 2005) (“According to this
view, practice in the two World Wars altered the legal status of the principle of
distinction from a time-honored principle of the [LOAC] to a legally meaningless
expression.”); ROGERS, supra note 162, at 13 (citing the practice during World War II
of bombing civilian centers of population).
189. 337 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1938) 937 (U.K.).
190. See SHAW, supra note 111, at 6 (“[J]ust as incidents of murder, robbery and
rape do occur within national legal orders without destroying the system as such, so
analogously assaults upon international legal rules point up the weaknesses of the
system without denigrating their validity or their necessity.”); Hayashi, supra note 188,
at 112 (noting the “vigorous defense” of the principle of distinction following World
War II).
191. AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(4).
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objects. 192 “Feasibility” takes into consideration the
circumstances in which the commander is making the
determination.193
2. Discrimination
Discrimination is a principle related to, but conceptually
different from, distinction. Article 51(4) of AP I outlines the
principle of discrimination: states must not only distinguish
between targets that are civilian and those that are legitimate
military objectives, but must also use weapons that are capable of
being “directed at a specific military objective.”194 Thus, if a
weapon were to be faithfully aimed at an appropriate target, but
physically was incapable of controlling the force released to a
designated physical area, the weapon would violate the principle
of discrimination.195 Examples of weapons that might violate the
principle are “long-range missile[s] with no, or only a
rudimentary, guidance system . . . [or] biological weapons that
spread contagious diseases.”196
If a commander reasonably anticipates that the weapon will
be able to properly “discriminate,” then they are in compliance
with the rule. A hypothetical example is a weapon that is
typically able to focus on a target, but malfunctions and causes
damage to surrounding areas; a commander would not violate
the principle of discrimination if he had taken “reasonable
precautions” to ensure that the weapon was capable of
discriminating, even though in this instance it did not.197 The
“feasibility” standard described in the preceding Section applies
to the amount of information a commander must gather before

192. Id. art. 57(2).
193. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1184 (stating that rules will be applied to
situations as they appeared to commanders at the time of the decision).
194. AP I, supra note 117, art. 51(4).
195. See DETTER, supra note 125, at 235 (noting that nuclear weapons may violate
the principle of discrimination because they are, by nature, incapable of confining
their destructive forces); KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 136 (“[I]t is prohibited to
use weapons that cannot be specifically targeted at military objectives because their
action is inherently indiscriminate.”).
196. Schmitt, supra note 122, at 147.
197. AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(4).
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he may make his determination on the legality of the strike
under the principle of discrimination, as well.198
Also relevant to an application of discrimination to cyber
weapons is the possible existence of knock-on effects. Knock-on
effects are consequences from an attack that a commander did
not intend or plan to occur.199 They happen because of the
existence of an “unexpected agent or circumstance.”200 Whether
knock-on effects cause an attack to be unlawful does not depend
upon the damage actually done by the weapon; instead, it turns
on whether the commander has “taken sufficient precautions
. . . [to ensure] that his attack does not go beyond its intended
target.”201
Professor Michael Schmitt has argued that if a virus or
worm has “no way to limit its subsequent retransmission” then it
is prohibited as an indiscriminate weapon. 202 An important
question is how certain a commander must be that knock-on
effects will not render his “weapon” indiscriminate before he
can lawfully deploy the weapon. 203 Article 51 states that the
standard is what is “expected.” 204 This would appear to give
military commanders broad discretion in determining whether
knock-on effects render an attack unlawful.205 Furthermore, the
commentary states that commander’s expectations will be valid
if they were made in “common sense and good faith.”206 With
respect to CNAs, commanders have stated that it is US policy to
determine whether the malware does “exactly” what it is
intended to do without any “unintended consequences.”207

198. See AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(2); see also supra notes 192–93 and
accompanying text (describing the feasibility standard and its application to
distinction).
199. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1149 (defining knock-on effects).
200. Id. at 1177.
201. Id. at 1178.
202. Schmitt, supra note 21, at 389.
203. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1179–86 (examining various possible standards
of certainty for commanders in these analyses); see also AP I, supra note 117,
art. 51(5)(b).
204. AP I, supra note 117, art. 51(5)(b).
205. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 181, at 2209–10 (stating that the standard
gives a “fairly broad margin of judgment” to commanders).
206. Id. at 2208.
207. Jensen, supra note 22, at 1149 n.12.
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3. Proportionality
Commentators recognize that the principle of distinction is
inadequate protection for civilians and civilian property in an
armed conflict. 208 Without another rule, one could justify
massive damage to civilians and civilian property simply by
selecting an otherwise valid military target.209 Proportionality, in
conjunction with distinction, is the LOAC principle designed to
protect civilians and civilian objects from harm through
unnecessary “collateral damage.”210 While distinction attempts
to prevent the targeting of civilians or civilian objects and
discrimination attempts to prevent the use of weapons that
cannot successfully focus on military targets, proportionality
regulates attacks in which damage to civilian property is a
foreseeable result of an attack on a valid military objective.211
Proportionality, therefore, sets a limit on what amount of
collateral destruction of civilian property, or death and injury to
civilians, is allowable when attacking an otherwise-permissible
military target. 212 Article 57(2) of AP I mandates that the
208. See ROGERS, supra note 162, at 7 (stating that additional principles put a
“brake” on attacks that would otherwise be permissible under the principle of military
necessity); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 8 (noting that further regulations
complement the principle of military necessity).
209. See CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 15 (“Determining that a person,
place, or thing qualifies as a lawful object of attack does not however categorically
establish the legality of attack.”); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting
that implementing rules for the principle of humanity put further restrictions on
military attacks).
210. Amnon Rubinstein, Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need for a
Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 100 (2011) (“[T]he principle
of proportionality entails a duty on the military commander to assess the attack’s
collateral damage . . . .”); CORN ET AL., supra note 126, ch. 4, at 15 (explaining that
proportionality requires commanders to consider the “collateral damage” of their
attacks).
211. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1170–71 (“Even if the target is legitimate, the
attacker is required to adjust his means and methods of attack so that the destruction
or death of the target does not include or cause a chain of events that will lead to the
death of civilians or destruction of civilian property that is excessive to the concrete and
direct military advantage to be gained.”); Schmitt, supra note 122, at 150
(“[P]roportionality operates in scenarios in which incidental injury and collateral
damage are the foreseeable, albeit undesired, result of attack on a legitimate target.”).
212. See AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(2)(b) (“An attack shall be cancelled or
suspended if it . . . may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”);
Rebecca J. Barber, The Proportionality Equation: Balancing Military Objectives with Civilian
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anticipated loss of life and damage to property incidental to
attacks must not be “excessive” in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage expected to be gained.213 Article 51(5)
also states that an attack will violate the LOAC if the collateral
damage is “excessive” when compared to the advantage
gained. 214 Since combatants and military objectives are
legitimate targets, loss of combatant’s lives or damage to military
objectives is not considered in the “proportionality equation.”215
Commanders are not required to have calculated this
proportionality equation correctly ex post facto; the analysis is
applied with the information available at the time of the
attack.216 The circumstances of the decision, such as the amount
of time a commander has to make the decision and the amount
of information reasonably obtainable, are considered.217
To weigh the military advantage gained against the loss of
civilian life and property, one must first define what constitutes a
military advantage. To confer any military advantage, the target
must first have been deemed a valid “military objective” under

Lives in the Armed Conflict in Afghanistan, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 476, 479 (2010)
(“[I]n assessing proportionality, military commanders must attempt to weigh the
expected loss of civilian life and/or damage to civilian property against the anticipated
military advantage.”).
213. See AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(2) (stating that an attack shall be cancelled if
it becomes apparent the collateral damage would be “excessive” when compared with
the military advantage gained); JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 98 (2004) (noting that proportionality is designed to
ensure incidental civilian damage is not “excessive”).
214. AP I, supra note 117, art. 51(5)(b). Note that Article 51 places this balancing
test under the rubric of “discrimination,” conflating two conceptually different
principles. See GARDAM, supra note 213, at 94 (“The designation of proportionality as a
species of indiscriminate attack confuses the idea of proportionality with the
requirement to distinguish between civilian and military targets.”).
215. See GARDAM, supra note 213, at 14 (explaining that harm to combatants is
considered under the principles of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and not
proportionality); Jensen, supra note 22, at 1171 (“[T]he rule of proportionality only
applies to civilians and civilian property. It is not an attempt to ensure a ‘fair fight’
between combatants.” (internal citations omitted)).
216. See Barber, supra note 212, at 477 (“[I]t is important to note that
commanders are not to be judged on the basis of an ex post facto assessment.”); Jensen,
supra note 22, at 1183 (noting that courts examine a commander’s decisions as the
situation appeared to the commander at the time).
217. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (describing how the feasibility
standard takes into consideration all the circumstances at the time of the decision).
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the principle of distinction.218 Once the object is deemed a valid
target, the most important factor considered is the effect
destroying or incapacitating the target will have on
accomplishing a military objective; the more essential the target
is to accomplishing an objective, the more damage to civilian
property will be tolerated. 219 “Military advantage” is further
defined in the AP I Commentary as consisting of “ground
gained and in annihilating or weakening the enemy armed
forces.”220 The military advantage must also be “concrete and
direct.”221
Next, the amount of collateral damage the attack is
expected to cause must be determined.222 Although AP I does
not provide a list of factors that should be considered, there are
some basic considerations that are likely applicable in most
calculations. 223 The proximity of the target to civilians and
civilian property, the density of the civilian population in the
area, the timing of the attack, the possibility of the release of
hazardous substances, and the ability of the weapon to target a
specific physical area should be considered. 224 More
fundamentally, human lives carry greater weight than physical
property in the calculation.225
The calculation commanders must make is a difficult one.
How is one to weigh the value of accomplishing a military

218. See GARDAM, supra note 213, at 100 (arguing that the distinction analysis
should occur prior to a proportionality analysis); see also Jensen, supra note 22, at 1170
(noting that the proportionality analysis occurs “[o]nce a commander has determined
that a target is a military objective”).
219. GARDAM, supra note 213, at 100 (“The more integral the proposed target is
to the military strategy, the higher the level of likely civilian casualties and damage to
civilian objects that will be acceptable.”); ROGERS, supra note 162, at 21–22 (“Clearly,
the more important the military objective, the greater the incidental losses before it
could be said that the rule of proportionality had been violated.”).
220. AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 181, at 2218.
221. AP I, supra note 117, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
222. See supra notes 212–17 and accompanying text (describing the two-part test).
223. See generally AP I, supra note 117 (failing to list any specific factors).
224. See GARDAM, supra note 217, at 103 (listing considerations for the civilian
damage side of the proportionality equation); ROGERS, supra note 162, at 23 (noting
factors that should be considered during proportionality analysis).
225. See generally Barber, supra note 212 (noting that human lives are considered
more valuable than physical property).
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objective against the value of human life and property? 226
Despite this difficulty, there is likely a consensus at the ends of
the “proportionality continuum.”227 For example, it is likely that
all governments would agree that a single injury to a civilian
would not be excessive compared to capturing a high-ranking
military commander, while neutralizing a single infantryman
would not justify the deaths of thousands of civilians.228 The
more difficult analysis, however, is in the middle of the
continuum.229
The existence of knock-on effects, discussed previously in
Part II.C.2, is also relevant to a proportionality analysis.230 The
legality of an attack under the principle of proportionality will
turn on whether the commander has taken sufficient
“precautions” to ensure that proportionality is not violated.”231
Commanders are once again subject to Article 57(2)(b) of AP I,
which applies an “expected” results test, as previously described
under the principle of discrimination.232 The analysis for a CNA
is greatly complicated by the possible presence of knock-on
effects; the collateral damage to civilians will be clear in a kinetic
attack but not in a CNA.233
The principles of distinction, discrimination, and
proportionality regulate combatants’ actions during an armed
conflict. They exist to further the LOAC goals of reducing
overall destruction in warfare, and reducing unnecessary harm
to civilians and civilian property. The principles apply to CNAs,
although not explicitly stated anywhere in the LOAC.234
226. See KOLB & HYDE, supra note 110, at 48 (stating that the military advantage
gained and civilian losses must be put into “some form of balance,” but not specifying
what form); Barber, supra note 212, at 476 (“[T]he considerations being weighed on
each side—the value of human lives on the one hand, the value of a military objective
on the other—are in many respects simply not amenable to comparison.”).
227. See Schmitt, supra note 122, at 170.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 170 (“The complexity emerges when one moves from these
extremes along the proportionality continuum toward the center.”)
230. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (describing knock-on
effects).
231. AP I, supra note 117, art. 57.
232. Id. art. 57(2)(b).
233. See Jensen, supra note 22, at 1178 (“[W]hen using kinetic weapons,
determining, at least in the short term, what injury and damage will occur can be much
clearer. This may not be so clear in relation to CNA.”).
234. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE LOAC TO STUXNET
The facts described in Part I.B–E support the conclusion
that Stuxnet was developed by Israel and the United States to
target Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility. The high value of Stuxnet’s
zero-day hacks, the discriminating nature of Stuxnet’s payload,
the substantial budget required to create Stuxnet, and the
suspicious reactions of Israeli and US officials demonstrate that
they both likely played a role in Stuxnet’s development and
deployment.235 This Note assumes that to be true. All other facts
about Stuxnet, such as how the worm worked and the damage
that it did to the nuclear installations, are analyzed based
entirely on available evidence.
Part III applies the principles of distinction, discrimination,
and proportionality to the facts of Stuxnet. It argues that, with
one exception, application of the LOAC to Stuxnet
accomplishes the LOAC goals and that Stuxnet therefore
represents one piece of evidence that current LOAC paradigms
adequately regulate cyber war. Section A of this Part applies the
principle of distinction to Stuxnet. Section B applies the
principle of discrimination. Section C applies the principle of
proportionality.
This Note concludes that, as applied to Stuxnet, the US
position that the LOAC adequately regulates cyber war is
fundamentally correct: existing LOAC rules adequately address
the issues Stuxnet raises. This is demonstrated in two ways. First,
the fundamental policy goals behind the rules of the LOAC are
furthered when applied to Stuxnet. Second, the LOAC has
already accomplished some of these goals, namely that the
programmers of Stuxnet appear to have specifically designed
the worm to conform to the rules of the LOAC.
A. Distinction Applied to Stuxnet
The application of distinction to Stuxnet must come first
because a determination that Natanz was not a valid military
objective would render Stuxnet illegal, regardless of the worm’s
adherence to the principles of discrimination and

235. See supra Part I.B–E.
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proportionality.236 It seems likely that the Natanz nuclear facility
constitutes an appropriate military target under the principle of
distinction. There are two possible purposes for the uranium
enrichment at Natanz. First, Iran could enrich uranium as part
of the creation of a nuclear weapon.237 The enriched uranium it
produces is a necessary component of nuclear weapons.238 This
would render Natanz a military target.239
Alternatively, the centrifuges could be enriching uranium
to fuel Iranian nuclear power plants, which would also render
Natanz an acceptable military target.240 A power plant has the
potential to power military structures. The power plant’s
“purpose”—providing electricity to military operations—
certainly makes an effective “military contribution,” considering
the power plant’s nature and function. 241 Disrupting power
generation would likely result in a definite military advantage:
military installations that would otherwise be operational would
be incapacitated.242 A nuclear power plant therefore would be a
valid military objective under Article 51(2). Logically, a facility
that provides essential component parts to power plants—here,
the enriched uranium—also would be a valid military objective.
Therefore, a commander would be “reasonable” in determining
that it was a permissible military target.243
In simply “choosing” a target, there is no fundamental
difference in distinction analysis between an attack on Natanz by
traditional weapons or by Stuxnet. If, however, Stuxnet
236. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (noting that the determination of
an object or individual as a valid military objective is the first step of any LOAC
analysis).
237. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (explaining that there are some
who believe Iran’s is enriching uranium to acquire a nuclear weapon).
238. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (stating that enriched uranium is
required for the development of a nuclear weapon).
239. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (explaining that munitions plants
are traditionally valid military objectives under the principle of distinction).
240. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting that Iran claims its nuclear
program is only for the purposes of generating nuclear power).
241. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text (stating that power plants
have historically been valid targets under distinction and that analysis of whether an
object is a valid military objective considers that object’s purpose).
242. See supra note 186 and accompanying text (explaining that power plants have
been considered valid military objectives in the past).
243. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text (describing the standard
commanders will be held to when performing a distinction analysis).
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intentionally infected civilian computers as a “stepping-stone” to
infecting Natanz, those initial infections may have violated the
principle of distinction. This would be true even if the civilian
computers suffered no harm, so long as they were explicitly
“targeted” by Stuxnet. Whether Stuxnet “targeted” these
computers is therefore a crucial factor in determining whether
Stuxnet violated the principle. In either scenario, however, the
application of the principle to Stuxnet both lowers the level of
overall destruction by requiring that the commander target only
military objectives, such the Natanz facility, and also decreases
the harm to civilians by requiring that the commander direct his
attack at Natanz. Stuxnet is therefore properly regulated under
the principle of distinction.
B.

Discrimination Applied to Stuxnet

While Stuxnet’s attack on Natanz largely conforms to the
principle of distinction, application of the principle of
discrimination is substantially more difficult. The primary issue
for Stuxnet is whether it is capable of discriminating between its
target and things that “surround” it. 244 With a traditional
weapon, this manifests itself in “collateral damage” to the
physical area surrounding the target. 245 With Stuxnet, it
manifests itself in potential damage to connected computers or
computer networks.246 Professor Michael Schmitt, an authority
on the law of cyber war, has argued that if a virus or worm
cannot limit its transmission, then it may be prohibited as
indiscriminate. 247 It seems, however, that there were some
controls put onto Stuxnet in an effort to limit subsequent
infections and direct its destructive effects solely at its intended
target.248
244. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text (noting that weapons that are
incapable of confining their force to military objectives may violate the principle of
discrimination).
245. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (stating that a missile fired without
a guidance system would likely violate the principle of discrimination).
246. See supra notes 98–102 (describing the effect of Stuxnet on computers
outside of Natanz).
247. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (describing Professor Michael
Schmitt’s theory on indiscriminate malware transmission).
248. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (describing the instructions
Stuxnet’s creators put into its code to limit subsequent infections).
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While Stuxnet closely controls the deployment of its
payload, Stuxnet is fundamentally indiscriminate in that it does
not distinguish among computers when spreading; it infects all
of the computers using the Windows operating system that it
can. 249 As stated previously, there have been over 100,000
estimated infections worldwide. 250 Stuxnet’s programmers,
however, designed the worm to only inflict damage upon the
Iranian nuclear facilities.251 By creating a series of conditions
that had to be fulfilled before Stuxnet’s payload would be
delivered, the programmers essentially put a safety lid on an
otherwise extremely dangerous weapon.252 As a result, despite
the 100,000 infections, it appears that Stuxnet’s payload has
never been deployed outside of the Iranian nuclear facilities.253
Siemens, the company whose software and hardware Stuxnet
targeted, has identified only twenty-four cases of infections at
industrial plants worldwide.254 In each case, Stuxnet’s payload
was not delivered and the company was able to detect the worm
and remove it without harm to their computer system.255 Thus,
in reality Stuxnet’s payload was deployed discriminately.
The damage actually done by Stuxnet is not what must be
considered when analyzing the principle of discrimination.256
What is relevant are the results commanders “expected” at the
time of deployment, and whether the commander in charge had
done “everything feasible” to gather information prior to that
deployment.257 Since there is no information available on the
249. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing Stuxnet’s
indiscriminate nature).
250. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing a Symantec study
tracking the number of Stuxnet infections).
251. See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (describing various limitations
hindering Stuxnet’s proliferation).
252. See supra notes 29–38 (describing the narrow circumstances in which
Stuxnet’s payload will be deployed).
253. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (stating that there has not been a
recorded deployment of Stuxnet’s payload outside of Natanz).
254. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (stating that a Siemens report
identified twenty-four industrial infections).
255. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting the successful removal of
Stuxnet from industrial hardware).
256. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (explaining the standard to
which commanders are held).
257. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (describing the “expected
results” and “everything feasible” standards of AP I).
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process by which the American or Israeli commanders
investigated the potential effects of Stuxnet’s payload, it is
difficult to draw a firm conclusion about Stuxnet’s expected
impact.258 Stuxnet’s code and its actual effects, however, can
help us surmise what a commander would have known.259
Stuxnet’s payload was unlikely to cause destruction outside
of the Iranian nuclear facilities—or at least outside of the few
facilities in the world that met the specific criteria required to
activate Stuxnet’s payload. 260 Stuxnet’s designers put a great
amount of effort into ensuring only Natanz’s centrifuges would
be struck by its payload.261 To develop such a highly specialized
cyber weapon, the commanders must have done substantial
investigation into whether Stuxnet’s payload was likely to be
deployed on non-Natanz PLCs. 262 This means that the
commander in charge likely satisfied the “everything feasible”
investigation requirement, and acted in “good faith” when
making the judgment that they “expected” Stuxnet to
successfully discriminate.263
It is also stated US policy to require commanders to fully
investigate possible unintended consequences of malware.264 As
such, it seems likely that at the time of deployment, a
commander would have satisfied the requirement that he does
everything feasible to determine the discriminatory nature of
Stuxnet.265 After satisfying that requirement, it appears that the
commander would have been reasonable in expecting Stuxnet

258. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (stating that Stuxnet’s origins are
currently unknown).
259. See supra Part I.B–E (describing Stuxnet’s code and its effects).
260. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text (noting that by programming
Stuxnet’s payload to be delivered in such narrow circumstances, Stuxnet’s
programmers rendered delivery of the payload outside of Natanz highly unlikely).
261. See supra note 74–77 and accompanying text (noting the attention paid by
Stuxnet’s programmers to ensuring Stuxnet’s payload was not discharged outside of
Natanz).
262. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (noting that US commanders are
required to perform substantial investigations into knock-on effects).
263. See supra notes 197–98 and accompanying text (describing the standard to
which commanders are held).
264. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (stating that US commanders are
required to make sure malware does “exactly” what it is supposed to).
265. See supra note 191–93 and accompanying text (describing the feasibility
standard).
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to discriminate effectively between lawful military targets and
prohibited ones, at least with regards to its payload.266
Another issue is whether Stuxnet could be considered
indiscriminate despite never deploying its payload outside of
Natanz.267 Despite more than 100,000 infections, Stuxnet should
not be considered indiscriminate under the LOAC. 268 The
extent of the damage that the civilian computers suffered is
unknown, but thought to be extremely minor. 269 Although
civilians have struggled to completely rid their computers of
Stuxnet, as have technicians at Natanz, the worm does not
replicate indefinitely when it infects a computer.270 It therefore
is incapable of “clogging” up a system as some worms can.271 A
few lines of code sitting “inert” in a computer system are
unlikely to cause any damage to a computer system.272
Application of the principle of discrimination to Stuxnet
demonstrates that Stuxnet successfully furthered LOAC policy
goals.273 Although extremely effective, Stuxnet almost certainly
would have had a better chance of destroying the centrifuges at
Natanz if it had not been so discriminating. There was almost
certainly a risk that the centrifuges that Stuxnet’s designers
wished to destroy might not fall within the specific parameters
Stuxnet required to deliver its payload. 274 If destroying the
centrifuges was the only factor that Stuxnet’s designers
considered, increasing the range of parameters necessary to
266. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (describing the reasonableness
standard).
267. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (explaining that Stuxnet’s payload
has not been delivered outside of Natanz).
268. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (explaining that Stuxnet has
infected more than 100,000 computers)
269. See supra Part I.D (describing Stuxnet’s negligible damage to civilian
computers).
270. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text (noting the limitations
Stuxnet’s code places on its ability to replicate).
271. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing how a worm can harm
computer networks despite the absence of a malicious payload).
272. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing Stuxnet as an “inert
feature” on the network when the parameters necessary to trigger its payload are not
present).
273. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (describing the two primary
LOAC policy objectives).
274. See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text (describing the “narrow”
parameters in which Stuxnet’s payload would be deployed).
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deliver Stuxnet’s payload would have been an easy way to
accomplish that objective.275 The designers, however, did not do
that. They gave up some operational effectiveness in return for
assuring that PLCs other than those controlling the centrifuges
would not be affected.276 This demonstrates that not only would
the principle of discrimination theoretically further LOAC
policy objectives, it likely already has furthered those
objectives.277 The designers of Stuxnet obeyed the LOAC rules,
even though jus in bello did not apply, and the policy objectives
of the LOAC were furthered. The application of the principle of
discrimination to Stuxnet assured that civilian objects were not
harmed and that the overall level of destruction caused by the
worm was minimalized.
C. Proportionality Applied to Stuxnet
In one respect, those who designed and deployed Stuxnet
acted in strict conformity with the principle of proportionality;
human lives are considered more valuable than physical
property and Stuxnet avoided any civilian casualties.278 If the
options being considered by Israel and the United States to
delay the Iranian nuclear program were: (1) bomb the facility,
or (2) use the Stuxnet worm, then Stuxnet was almost certainly
less likely to violate the principle of proportionality than a
kinetic attack.279
Stuxnet enabled the commander in charge to target and
destroy the uranium centrifuges with no loss of life and
comparatively little damage to civilian objects.280 In comparison,
Israel’s 2007 strike on Syria, which also targeted a nuclear facility
buried underground, resulted in the physical destruction of the
275. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text (suggesting that Stuxnet’s
designers considered factors other than its operational effectiveness).
276. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that Stuxnet’s payload has
not been deployed outside of Natanz).
277. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (describing the LOAC policy
goals).
278. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (explaining that civilian lives are
given greater weight in the proportionality analysis than civilian property).
279. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (describing the massive
property damage that occurred when Israel struck a Syrian nuclear facility).
280. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text (noting that Stuxnet caused
minimal damage to civilian property).
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entire site.281 While wholesale destruction previously may have
been the only way to accomplish a valid military objective, now a
commander may be able to simply “turn off” an enemy facility.
Stuxnet seems to follow this logic, although the centrifuges were
not simply “turned off” and instead were destroyed in a manner
similar to a traditional kinetic attack.282
In fact, without considering knock-on effects, it seems
extremely unlikely that Stuxnet violated the principle of
proportionality. The centrifuges and PLCs were both lawful
military targets under the principle of distinction, so without the
subsequent delivery of Stuxnet’s payload to civilian computers,
there would be almost no way for the principle to be violated,
simply because there was no collateral damage.283
Civilian computers were infected subsequently, however,
and it was certainly foreseeable, so one must consider whether
the infections constitute a violation of the principle of
proportionality. 284 To do so, one must first ask exactly what
military advantage was gained by deploying Stuxnet.285 As stated
above, Stuxnet destroyed almost 1000 centrifuges. 286 The
damage was extensive and multifaceted. 287 While Israel’s
government has previously said Iran was on the brink of
acquiring nuclear weapons, the country’s outgoing intelligence
chief estimated recently that Iran could not obtain nuclear
weapons before 2015.288 If that is true, the military advantage
gained is significant.

281. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (describing Israel’s attack on a
Syrian nuclear site).
282. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (describing how Stuxnet
destroyed centrifuges at Natanz).
283. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (explaining that determining that
the target is a valid military objective is the first step of the analysis).
284. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting more than 100,000 civilian
computer infections).
285. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (explaining that analyzing the
military advantage gained by the attack is the first step of the proportionality test).
286. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (stating that the Iranian
government removed 984 centrifuges from Natanz).
287. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (explaining the numerous ways
in which Stuxnet may have damaged the Iranian nuclear program).
288. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that Israeli officials now
estimate that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon until 2015).
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The second part of the test requires assessment of the
collateral damage inflicted on civilians and civilian objects.289 As
stated above, the actual damage to civilian computers appears
minimal: the payload was never delivered to civilian computers;
the “inert” worm caused little to no damage to civilian
computers; and the worm has a “self-destruct” deadline that is
rapidly approaching. 290 The military advantage gained by
deploying Stuxnet—setting back Iran’s nuclear program several
years—was significantly greater than the harm to civilian objects.
API Article 57(2) requires that the damage to civilian objects be
excessive when compared with the military advantage gained;
Stuxnet was not excessive since essentially no damage was done
to civilian computers and the military advantage was so great.291
In fact, as far as its actual effects are considered, Stuxnet is at the
end of the “proportionality continuum,” in which a broad
consensus would exist that it did not violate the principle.292 It is
not the actual effects of the worm, however, that must be
analyzed; the relevant issues are what results commanders
“expected” at the time of deployment.293 Given the minimal
amount of collateral damage caused by Stuxnet, Stuxnet’s
commanders were almost certainly reasonable in their
calculations.294 This is not conclusive, however: should further
analysis reveal that a common circumstance exists where
Stuxnet’s payload deployment parameters are met, and it was
simply fortunate that Stuxnet never encountered this
circumstance, the commander’s reasonability could be
questioned.
Analysis of knock-on effects will also be similar to the
analysis of the distinction principle in Part III.A. The test is
289. See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text (listing factors used during
the evaluation of collateral damage in the proportionality equation).
290. See supra notes 74, 100–02 and accompanying text (describing the selfdestruct deadline, the absence of payload deployment, and the lack of damage done to
civilian computers).
291. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting the “excessive”
requirement in the proportionality test).
292. See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text (describing the
“proportionality continuum”).
293. See supra notes 192–93, 204 and accompanying text (explaining the
“expected results” and “everything feasible” standards of AP I).
294. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (describing the reasonableness
standard).
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whether a “reasonable” commander would have thought the
attack conformed to the principle of proportionality, given that
he took all “feasible” steps to obtain relevant information under
the circumstances.295 Again, while it is impossible to know what
steps were taken, circumstantial evidence points strongly toward
the conclusion that American and Israeli commanders took
great care to limit any possible unintended consequences of the
worm. Stuxnet’s self-destruct instructions, limits on selfreplication, and specific requirements for deployment of its
payload all support the conclusion that it was objectively
reasonable to believe that Stuxnet would pass the
proportionality test.
The application of the proportionality principle to Stuxnet
also furthers the policy goals of the LOAC.296 Complying with
the principle of proportionality required the developers of the
worm to carefully program it so that any harm to civilian
computers would not be excessive.297 This lessened the impact of
the attack on civilians. As noted in the analysis of discrimination
in Part III.B, commanders could have ensured the destruction of
the centrifuge by simply bombing the site, or by using a
variation of Stuxnet that did not limit deployment of its payload
so narrowly, but they did not do this. They lessened “collateral
damage” to civilians and civilian property and designed Stuxnet
in a way that sacrificed operational efficiency.
Falling under “proportionality,” however, is the area in
which current LOAC rules most likely fail to regulate an aspect
of Stuxnet: the “release” of the worm’s code to the public at
large. When a worm or virus is released into a computer
network, it does not destroy itself in the process of doing its
damage, as a kinetic weapon does. 298 The individuals who
released Stuxnet thus gave others a powerful weapon with which
to attack their enemies. The recent development of the Duqu

295. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (explaining the standard to
which commanders are held).
296. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text (describing the LOAC policy
goals).
297. See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text (describing the “excessive”
requirement).
298. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (noting the proliferation of
Stuxnet to numerous computers after its initial deployment).
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virus demonstrates this principle.299 While it is not known who
developed Duqu, commentators have speculated that a third
party, unrelated to Stuxnet’s initial development, may have
taken Stuxnet’s code and modified it for their own uses.300
Should future use of Stuxnet’s code by third parties factor
into a proportionality analysis? Under current LOAC rules, the
issue is still governed by whether a commander should rationally
“expect” the resulting harm. 301 With this in mind, it is not
unreasonable to “expect” that someone with malicious intent
could redesign Stuxnet to cause harm. There are numerous
unanswered questions that must be considered in a rational
expectation test: how likely it is that the source code will be
decrypted?; how likely it is that the decrypted code will be made
publicly available?; what kind of damage could reasonably be
caused by new versions of the malware?; how central to the new
malware would the original code have to be to connect the
subsequent harm to the original attack?; and how far into the
future would these connections extend? It seems impossible to
answer some of these questions realistically. Predicting what
every criminal group, terrorist cell, hacker, and government
would do with the code of a cyber weapon seems to be an
unworkable test for a commander to apply. While the “rational
expectation” standard is straightforward and easy to administer
on a physical battlefield, and also seems to apply well to both the
immediate and knock-on consequences of a cyber attack, it is
questionable whether it can effectively regulate subsequent third
party action following the release of a cyber weapon. New
regulations therefore may be necessary.
CONCLUSION
Stuxnet almost certainly foreshadows a fundamental
change in modern warfare. It demonstrates that a wellorchestrated CNA can strike a target with greater precision,
greater damage to the enemy, and less collateral loss of life and
property than a kinetic weapon. Will the change in warfare,
299. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (describing the Duqu virus).
300. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (speculating about who may be
responsible for Duqu).
301. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (noting the proportionality
analysis is covered by the “expectation” standard).
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however, be so drastic that it also necessitates a change in the
LOAC? The answer appears to be both “yes” and “no.”
The principles of distinction, discrimination, and
proportionality, when applied to Stuxnet, further the LOAC
policy goals of reducing overall destruction in warfare and
reducing unnecessary harm to civilians and civilian property.
Further, evidence that Stuxnet’s programmers may have
designed it to conform with the LOAC, and the subsequent
benefits that that conformity brought, demonstrates that
compliance with the LOAC is possible, practical, and beneficial.
In this respect, the LOAC seems to adequately regulate Stuxnet.
Stuxnet therefore should be considered a piece of evidence that
fundamental alterations to the LOAC are not necessary to
regulate cyber weapons.
The current LOAC principles, however, appear unable to
properly address the dangers associated with the acquisition of
Stuxnet’s source code by third parties. The worldwide
proliferation of such a weapon may require additional treaties to
regulate this potential danger. Whether such a treaty is feasible,
given the proven effectiveness of cyber weapons, remains to be
seen.

